SERVARE VITAS : Political consequences for Romanian National Government and military of hostage deaths in a Romanian Special Operations Forces hostage rescue operation by Rapanu, Adrian.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-09
SERVARE-VITAS political consequences for
Romanian national government and military of
hostage deaths in a Romanian Special Operations
Forces hostage rescue operation
Rapanu, Adrian.










Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
SERVARE VITAS- POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR 
ROMANIAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OF 
HOSTAGE DEATHS IN A ROMANIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS 









 Thesis Advisor:   Kalev Sepp 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time 
for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing 
and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, 
Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-
4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  SERVARE VITAS- Political Consequences for 
Romanian National Government and Military of Hostage Deaths in a 
Romanian Special Operations Forces Hostage Rescue Operation  
6. AUTHOR(S) Adrian Rapanu 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     




     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Humankind conflicts reached a point where the use of terrorism continues to be viewed as an acceptable and 
valuable instrument to pursue political goals. Because of the fact that the Romanian forces have encountered little 
action in the terrorism arena, one can say that the Romanian counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism arrangements within 
the law enforcement and military are immature. 
This paper attempts to shed light upon the current crisis management procedures and how that arrangement 
can affect the effectiveness of the state response in hostage situation crises both in country and abroad. The paper 
analyzes five hostage rescue operations, conducted by German, British, Peruvian, and Russian forces, and focuses on 
three critical procedures that lead to hostage deaths: security measures, negotiations, and handling the media. The 
analysis exposes that the effectiveness of these procedures will minimize the civilian casualties and will act as 
prerequisites for successful hostage rescue operations.   
In the light of the case studies results, a general-based model provides the Romanian authorities with critical 
tasks faced by either military or law enforcements assets that are required in order to accomplish rescue operations. 
The project concludes with a number of suggestions for immediate and long-term alleviation of current development 
problems faced by Romanian Special Operations Forces. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
99 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Crisis management, Hostage rescue, Negotiations, Media, Operation 
MAGIC FIRE, Operation NIMROD, Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR, Operation NORD OST, 
London, Mogadishu, Lima, Moscow, Beslan. 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii




POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR ROMANIAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
AND MILITARY OF HOSTAGE DEATHS IN A ROMANIAN SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS FORCES HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATION 
 
Adrian G. Rapanu 
First Lieutenant, Romanian Army 
B.S., Romanian Ground Forces Academy, 1995 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Humankind conflicts reached a point where the use of terrorism continues 
to be viewed as an acceptable and valuable instrument to pursue political goals. 
Because of the fact that the Romanian forces have encountered little action in 
the terrorism arena, one can say that the Romanian counter-terrorism and anti-
terrorism arrangements within the law enforcement and military are immature. 
This paper attempts to shed light upon the current crisis management 
procedures and how that arrangement can affect the effectiveness of the state 
response in hostage situation crises both in country and abroad. The paper 
analyzes five hostage rescue operations, conducted by German, British, 
Peruvian, and Russian forces, and focuses on three critical procedures that lead 
to hostage deaths: security measures, negotiations, and handling the media. The 
analysis exposes that the effectiveness of these procedures will minimize the 
civilian casualties and will act as prerequisites for successful hostage rescue 
operations.   
In the light of the case studies results, a general-based model provides the 
Romanian authorities with critical tasks faced by either military or law 
enforcements assets that are required in order to accomplish rescue operations. 
The project concludes with a number of suggestions for immediate and long-term 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism is not going away. For the terrorists, no one is an 
innocent victim, no one is a neutral. To terrorists, human life is just 
another commodity which can be bartered for gain. 
(Norman Antokol and Mayer Nudell, No One a Neutral,  
1990, p. 166) 
 
A. BACKGROUND  
1. The Romanian Politico-Military Context 
The new millennium has brought international terrorism in a particularly 
severe form, threatening states’ security and global stability. Since international 
terrorism has become more complex and unpredictable, Romania has reasserted 
its position against this threat through domestic measures and participation in 
international counterterrorism efforts.  
Romania, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member since 
April 2004, has developed a new set of responsibilities for its armed forces, and 
has deployed approximately 2,000 military personnel in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Their battlefield experience, although wide-ranging, is limited to 
peacekeeping missions, such as patrolling, site security, convoy protection, and 
humanitarian assistance (Consiliul, 1999). 
2.  The Romanian Special Operations Forces Battalion (RSOFB) 
The Romanian government responded to the emergence of asymmetric 
threats to its national interests in March–April 2003 by creating the 1st Special 
Forces Battalion in 2003 and adopting The Doctrine for Special Operations 
(Romanian Ministry of National Defense [MoND] 2003). Among the sixteen types 
of missions specified, combating terrorism (CBT), direct action (DA), and 
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strategic reconnaissance (SR) have priority over the rest.1 The Special 
Operations doctrine states that the Combating Terrorism mission will focus on 
three tasks: the rescue of hostages, the recovery or capture of sensitive materiel, 
and the targeting of terrorist organization infrastructure (Romanian Ministry of 
National Defense, 2003, pp. 15–16).  
 
B. PURPOSE 
Hostage rescue is set to become a major focus of the Romanian Special 
Forces units and in the Romanian effort to fight terrorism. There is a problem in 
this, however, because Romanian forces lack experience in hostage rescue. The 
lack of Romanian expertise in crisis management in hostage rescue situations 
must be compensated for by the thorough study of other forces’ experiences. 
This paper is such a study, drawing on the experience of other countries to 
create an assessment of the best practices and to isolate the crucial elements of 
hostage rescue. Ultimately, this study will provide some preliminary guidance to 
the Romanian Special Forces as they develop operational procedures for 
hostage rescue. A thorough understanding of the steps required in a hostage 
rescue operation is vital for policy decision makers and the Romanian Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) community, to ensure to the maximum extent possible 
the protection and security of Romanian citizens.   
That these issues are important can be seen by the public reaction to the 
Russian hostage rescue operations in 2002 and 2004. They resulted in so many 
fatalities that the public discourse in several countries inferred that it is better to 
throw in one’s lot with terrorists than to be “rescued” by the Russian authorities. 
This is not only embarrassing to the Russian government, but also to the image 
of the Russian military forces. The negative perceptions of how the Russians 
handle hostage crises raised the issue of how the Romanian SOF might perform 
                                            
1 U.S. Joint Pub 3-07.02, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, 
defines “combating terrorism” as “actions taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat 
spectrum. Antiterrorism (AT) involves defensive measures utilized to reduce the vulnerability to 
terrorists’ acts. Counterterrorism (CT) consists of offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and 
respond to terrorism” (U. S. Joint Pub 3-07.02, 1998, p. vii). 
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in a similar scenario. Will they be able to launch effective hostage rescue 
operations that minimize risk, or will they inadvertently cause high civilian 
casualties? This issue is important not only for the practical consequences of 
minimizing civilian risk, but also for the potential political consequences to the 
Romanian national government and military forces, in particular the Romanian 
SOF.  
Considering that Romania is now a democratic country, this paper 
hypothesizes that Romanian decision makers will be careful in making decisions 
to resolve hostage situations so as to save the lives of all the hostages. The 
conclusions that come out from this paper indicate that media influence and 
human rights legislation will drive policy makers to act in the best interest of 
hostages, because democratic governments are responsive to public opinion. 
Therefore, this paper will create a model for crisis management that fits 
Romanian requirements. The model will be based on comparative analyses of 
two types of hostage rescue operations: those that result in minimal or no 
hostage fatalities and those with major hostage losses. Furthermore, this paper 
will apply this model to different scenarios that the Romanian SOF might face in 
the new security environment.  
 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In identifying a model for crisis management, the first step is to identify the 
critical tasks involved in hostage crisis situations. There are several critical tasks 
that are employed before and after a hostage rescue operation is performed. Are 
there any differences in the crisis management procedures that might result in 
different levels of civilian casualties? If so, what are these differences?  By 
answering these initial questions, this paper will be able to identify a model for 
Romanian officials to use in hostage crisis management. Finally, this paper will 
address the question of how human rights legislation and the media affect the 
political consequences of high casualties in hostage rescue operations. 
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D.  METHODOLOGY 
The paper draws on primary and secondary literature on the factors that 
lead to civilian casualties in hostage rescue operations. Here, the goal is to 
identify crisis management procedures as a critical variable in operational 
outcomes. The procedures are identified by pairing case studies that identify the 
variations between cases that result in minor casualties and those that result in 
major casualties. 
a. Three cases in which hostage crises ended with minimal fatalities: 
Operation Magic Fire. The hostage rescue conducted by German Special 
Forces in Mogadishu, Somalia 
Operation Nimrod. The hostage rescue executed by British Special Forces 
in London, England 
Operation Chavin de Huantar. The hostage rescue performed by Peruvian 
Special Forces in Lima, Peru 
b. Two cases in which hostage crises ended with major fatalities:2 
Operation Nord Ost. The hostage rescue conducted by Russian Special 
Forces in Moscow, Russia 
The Beslan Disaster (Russia’s 9/11). The hostage rescue performed by 
Russian Special Forces in Beslan, North Osetia, Russia 
The cases selected fit the following profile: 
They were undertaken in situations other than war. 
They were considered to be international political events. 
The assailants were part of insurgent or terrorist organizations.  
                                            
2 Another significant example of high-casualty operation is the “Maalot Massacre” in Israel. 
On May 15, 1974, Israeli Special Forces, Sayeret Matkal, stormed a school where more than 90 
children were hold hostage by members of the Democratic Front of Palestine Liberation, a faction 
affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). During the rescue mission, 26 children 
were killed and 71 wounded. This case cannot be adequately analyzed due to a lack of 
unclassified sources pertaining to Israeli crisis management procedures. 
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With the exception of the Beslan hostage crisis, the governments decided 
to use force against the hostage takers.3 
After applying a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) crisis management 
procedures model to this comparative study, this paper will refine an ideal crisis 
management model that may be employed by the Romanian authorities and the 
1st Romanian SOF Battalion. Furthermore, this paper will examine the media’s 
influence in regard to hostage rescue operations and will analyze current 
Romanian legislation on human rights as it pertains to hostage crises. The paper 
will conclude by identifying the implications and lessons of this study for the 
Romanian Special Forces. 
 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
The second chapter deals with some basic methods used to understand a 
hostage crisis: crisis management procedures and process, measures of 
success and failure, and concepts concerning principles of hostage rescue 
operations. 
Chapter III analyzes the crisis management process in three case studies 
of hostage rescue operations with minimal casualties. First, in Operation Magic 
Fire, on October 18, 1977, the German counterterrorist unit, Grentzschutzgruppe 
9 (GSG-9), assaulted a Lufthansa airplane hijacked by four members of Wadi 
Haddad’s Palestinian terrorist group. The GSG-9 rescued eighty-six hostages 
and killed three terrorists: none of the hostages were lost. Second, on May 5, 
1980, in Operation Nimrod, the British Special Air Service (SAS) stormed the 
Iranian embassy in London and rescued twenty-one hostages. In a third hostage 
rescue operation, April 22, 1997, the Peruvian Special Forces conducted 
Operacion Chavin de Huantar against the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru. 
After 126 days of siege and negotiations with fourteen MRTA terrorists, 150 
Peruvian Special Forces paratroopers stormed the embassy, killed all the 
                                            
3 After two explosives were heard inside the school, Russian Special Forces were sent to 
neutralize the hostage-takers. Russian authorities claim that a tactical response was not 
considered (see Chapter IV for details). 
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terrorists, and released seventy-one hostages. During the operation, two soldiers 
were killed and one hostage died of a heart attack. 
Chapter IV covers two cases in which the poor management of a hostage 
crisis resulted in a major loss of life. First, on October 23, 2002, a group of forty-
one Chechen radicals took over the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow and held over 
eight hundred hostages. Three days later, Russian Special Forces (Alpha and 
Vympel teams) pumped an aerosol version of the incapacitant fentanyl into the 
theater, and then stormed in. Of the 129 hostage fatalities, the powerful gas killed 
125. The second hostage event took place on September 1, 2004, in School No. 
1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia, when thirty-two Chechen rebels took more 
than 1,200 hostages. On September 3, Russian Special Forces and armed 
volunteers attempted to storm the building after the terrorists detonated one of 
the explosives inside. During the eleven hours of fighting that followed, more than 
three hundred hostages were killed and seven hundred wounded. 
Finally, Chapter V deals with the crisis management procedures that 
Romanian authorities should use during a hostage situation. The chapter also 
includes a brief analysis of the Romanian media and Romanian human rights 
legislation. The last section of the chapter will identify some of the most salient 










II. SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN HOSTAGE CRISES: 
CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, AND THEORIES 
Sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and 
distances is the proper course of action for military leaders. 
Sun Tzu, “Terrain,” The Art of War 
 
A.  RISK MANAGEMENT AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
This chapter defines a number of important operational and doctrinal 
terms that will be used throughout this study in implementing the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) framework for “risk management.” The chapter 
lays out a thorough approach that begins with risk identification, includes the 
diverse stakeholders involved in the assessment of the risk and the decision(s) to 
be made, and concludes with management decisions and communication. 
Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling 
risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk 
costs with mission benefits. (FM 100-14, 1998)  
While the concept of risk management deals with the creation of 
appropriate policies to prevent and control a possible threat, “crisis management” 
works from an operational perspective to detail the critical measures and actions 
that should be adopted to deal with a specific terrorist event.  
In the U.S. government publication Joint Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures for Antiterrorism (U.S. Joint Pub. 3.07.2, 1998), crisis management is 
defined as a reactive phase that includes actions taken to resolve a terrorist 
incident, in this case, hostage taking. Seven tasks are considered critical to 
effective crisis management:  
(1) awareness of the possibility of multiple incidents or diversionary 
tactics,  
(2) activation of required resources by the local authorities,  
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(3) notifications to appropriate military (secret service) investigative 
agency (i.e., the FBI),  
(4) exercise of authorities’ representative with media,  
(5) negotiation,  
(6) implementation of tactical measures to contain or defeat the threat, 
and  
(7) preparation of after-action measures to protect the evidence, handle 
captured personnel, identify and process hostages, and discover needed 
changes to the existing plan (U.S. Joint Pub 3.07,1998, p. VI-2).  
This study will focus on the requirements that present a great risk to 
hostages in a hostage-taking situation:4 (1) security measures, including activities 
for isolating the incident and medical preparations for treating injured hostages, 
(2) negotiation, and (3) handling the media.  
Although risk management will not be analyzed in this study, it is important 
to stress that crisis management procedures depend on effective risk 
management. Both are developed and explained in the Antiterrorism Program 
Concept (U.S. Joint Pub 3.07.2, 1998).  
 
B. SUCCESS IN HOSTAGE CRISES 
Ideally, every government should assure its citizens that it could 
successfully resolve any hostage situation that might arise. Generally, there are 
two methods that political leaders can use in a barricaded/hostage situation to 
save hostages’ lives: negotiation and a hostage rescue operation.5 The preferred 
solution should be to free the hostages through negotiation without yielding to the 
                                            
4 The term “hostage-taking” is defined as “the act of illegally holding one or more persons 
captive [in a known location] in order to make political demands” and is different from kidnapping 
to gain publicity (Antokol, Nudell, 1990, p. 23).   
5 Situations in which assailants have barricaded themselves in with their hostages, and 
fortified their location by blocking its access from outside. A non-barricade situation implies that 
the hostage takers are in an open area and their only means for threatening hostages’ lives are 
their weapons (McMains, Mullins, 2001, p. 39). 
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terrorists’ demands. If political leaders decide to use a tactical response, they 
should be aware of all consequences.  
1.  Success in Hostage Rescue Operations 
Numerous military thinkers have defined criteria for success in hostage 
rescue operations. This study follows the definition identified by Major General 
Shlomo Gazit, now retired, who, as Israel’s director of military intelligence, 
participated in the planning of the 1976 Entebbe hostage rescue operation. 
According to General Gazit, there are three goals that a rescue operation must 
accomplish: 
• The hostages are all rescued safe and alive. 
• The operation is concluded with no (or minimal) rescue-force 
casualties.  
• The operation itself does not create any political or military 
complications beyond those created by the hostage-taking episode 
(Gazit, 1981, p. 112).  
Because these operations are highly sensitive, a decision to proceed with 
force should only be made when there is no other alternative.  Also, the entire 
responsibility of the command and control of a hostage rescue operation, from 
the beginning of the crisis to its end, should rest on the political leaders. They 
should provide the rescue force with the intended goals, restrictions, and timely 
interventions consistent with the ongoing progress. The political leaders must 
understand the implications of such decisions and must comprehend also the 
significance of possible failure. This is why they must play a part in the entire 
planning of the rescue operation, including detailed approval of all contingency 
plans. If there are other solutions or efforts that can free the hostages, the 
political leaders should cancel the rescue operation immediately, without any 
hesitation (pp. 133–135). 
Although the purpose and political motives of a rescue operation differ 
from those of other military special operations, the principles for accomplishing a 
rescue or other special-operations mission are almost identical. Rear Admiral 
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William Mc Raven (1996) indicates that there are six basic principles involved in 
the achievement of “relative superiority” in all special operations: simplicity, 
security, speed, surprise, repetition, and purpose.6 If one of those principles is 
ignored or overlooked, the mission’s outcome will have some degree of failure. 
Moreover, to be effective, the principles must be correlated with one another.  
Of all the many types of special operations, rescue operations are the 
most difficult. And as rescue plans increase in complexity, it becomes harder and 
harder to screen the political intentions and adequately prepare the rescue 
mission (McRaven, 1996, pp. 8–9). These missions require better training, better 
intelligence information, and more surgical precision in their execution than other 
types of special operations. Gazit’s theory of success in hostage rescue 
operations emphasizes that there are at least three critical interrelated principles: 
intelligence, deception, and surprise.  
Like McRaven’s principles, those in Gazit’s theory must complement and 
support each other in every detail. Without critical information regarding the 
hostage takers, the hostages, and even the seemingly minor obstacles to the 
rescue, the element of surprise will be compromised. Focusing or shifting the 
hostage takers’ attention on or to other matters during the actual storming—
never an easy task—can help the rescue force attain the end objective. However, 
there are no guaranties that the hostage takers will not kill the hostages during 
the storm. Major Carlos Perez (2004) argues that an “operator’s skills” are just as 
important as the other three principles in a rescue operation. Rescue team 
members must attain high competency levels in a variety of special skills, such 
as specialized shooting techniques, obstacle-breaching maneuvers, technical 
and tactical surveillance, and close-quarters combat skills (p. 15).  
2.  Negotiations with Hostage Takers 
A vast amount special-operations literature is devoted to hostage 
negotiations. This paper uses a simplified approach to reduce this very complex 
topic: it focuses on the procedures in hostage negotiations that are a 
                                            
6 William McRaven defines “relative superiority as “a condition that exists when an attacking 
force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy” (p. 4). 
11 
precondition of a hostage rescue operation or operations. Negotiations with 
crusader-type terrorists are controversial, because many countries have a firm 
policy against making concessions to terrorists.7 Yet, in many cases, both the 
authorities and the hostage takers find that there are advantages to conducting a 
dialogue in barricaded hostage situations. From the authorities’ perspective, 
negotiations may wear down the hostage takers’ resistance and persuade them 
to accept a peaceful negotiated surrender. Opening a dialogue could at least 
gain time for the authorities to plan a rescue attempt or to perform a successful 
assault. For the terrorists, the process of negotiation may ensure that their 
actions and demands are widely publicized (Antokol, Nudell, 1990, pp. 133–134).   
A major aspect of negotiating with hostage takers is the “stalling for time” 
tactic.8 According to a U.S. Department of State hostage negotiation manual 
(1983), the use of a stalling-for-time tactic could have the following results: (1) 
increased human needs (2) reduction of anxiety and stress, (3) greater 
rationality, (4) additional time for intelligence gathering, (5) the development of 
rapport and trust, and (6) reduced expectations (Antokol, Nudell, 1990, pp. 4–5). 
If the authorities believe that a rescue operation will solve the crisis, then a 
negotiated dialogue should continue until sufficient critical information about the 
hostage takers has been gathered.   
Another issue of hostage negotiations is the choice of negotiator. The 
negotiator should not be a decision maker, because:  
• The stalling-for-time tactic will not have the same effect: it will make 
the decision maker less credible when claiming that he/she must 
approve every step. 
• A decision maker may lose his/her objectivity and may even lose 
control of the entire situation (Antokol, Nudell, 1990, p. 10). 
                                            
7 Frederick J. Hacker argues that are three types of terrorists and each type is characterized 
by specific goals: criminal-type (e.g. Al Capone), crazy- type (e.g. Charles Whitman, Ted Bundy), 
and crusader-type (e.g. PLO, Al-Qaeda, MRTA, IRA etc.)  Information retrieved from:  
http://c21.maxwell.af.mil/amedd/hostage_negotiation.htm last accessed on 3 September 2005. 
8 In Hostage Negotiation Manual (1983) are presented other four tactics used: obtaining 
information, calming a hostage- taker, establishing rapport, and persuading (pp. 5- 9). 
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C. FAILURE IN HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS 
Defense scholars Eliot Cohen and John Gooch (1991) have proposed a 
theory of failure in military operations. They consider three basic types of failure 
as the main factors in “military misfortunes” failure to learn, failure to adapt, and 
failure to anticipate. The three types of failure often result from circumstances 
such as overconfidence in an operator’s or operators’ abilities, a lack of 
contingency planning and preparation, and the critical need to accomplish a 
mission by any means during a limited window of opportunity. 
In his book Perilous Options, Lucien Vandenbroucke (1993) illustrates four 
factors as persistent problems for SOF operations: faulty intelligence, reduced 
interagency cooperation and coordination, insufficient information and advice to 
decision makers, and an unnecessary control of the mission from afar.   
By combining Cohen and Gooch’s theory and Vandenbroucke’s four 
factors with selected crisis management procedures to approach two case 
studies, this paper will identify the measures that are and those that are not 
implemented in hostage operations with minimal casualties versus operations 
with major casualties. Through this analysis, the study will identify prerequisites 









III. CASE STUDY: HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS WITH 
MINIMAL FATALITIES 
A.  CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES FOR THE GERMAN GSG 9 IN 
OPERATION MAGIC FIRE, MOGADISHU, SOMALIA, 1977 
1. Background 
During 1968–1977 period, West Germany faced a series of terrorist 
attacks, launched primarily by one of the famous left-oriented terrorist groups, the 
Red Army Faction (RAF).9  After a number of RAF bank robberies, car bombings, 
and killings, the German authorities felt forced to respond with aggressive tactics, 
but were open to any strategy that would end the crisis.  After two principal RAF 
leaders were imprisoned in June 1972, subsequent terrorist attacks were 
intended to free the prisoners. Ultimately, the German authorities would use 
those terrorist attacks to support new laws for combating terrorism.  
On September 5, 1972, the German authorities were tested in a major 
international hostage crisis at the Olympic Village in Munich. Eight members of 
the Palestine group Black September managed to kill two Israeli athletes and to 
take nine prisoners.10 The main reason for the attack was the restriction of 
Palestine athletes from competing in the 1972 Summer Olympic Games because 
Palestine was not recognized as a state. The hostage takers made two principal 
demands: that Israel release the two imprisoned RAF leaders, which showed a 
degree of solidarity with the RAF, and another 234 prisoners held in Israel. 
During the crisis the German government planned to release their prisoners, but 
they encountered firm opposition from the Israelis, who opposed meeting the 
hostages’ demands. The Israeli government, while it refused to meet the 
                                            
9 The group was also called the “Baader-Meinhof gang.” Andreas Baader, one of the 
founders of the group, was first caught by the German police in 1968. With the help of the 
journalist Ulrich Meinhof, he escaped in May 1970. This marked the gang’s origin. Eventually, 
both were captured, in June 1972, after a series of bank robberies and bombings. Both 
committed suicide in prison, Meinhof on May 9, 1976, and Baader on October 18, 1977, right 
after the GSG 9 rescue mission in Mogadishu. For more information visit:  http://www.baader-
meinhof.com/index.htm. Last accessed on October 6, 2005. 
10 Black September was formed as an instrument of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) against King Hussein of Jordan for the expulsion of thousands of Palestinians from Jordan. 
For more information visit: http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=153. Last accessed on October 
6, 2005.  
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terrorists’ demands, failed to find a substitute concession that would appease the 
group (Aston, 1982, p. 75). Facing a difficult and complex situation that seemed 
intractable, the Germans chose to attack the hostage takers during their transfer 
from helicopters to an airplane. Unprepared for what followed, the police 
marksmen found that they could not pin down the hostage takers without 
endangering Israeli lives. As a result, during an hour-long gunfight with the 
German forces, Black September members managed to kill all the hostages. This 
event had an enormous effect on both the authorities and the security forces 
involved in the crisis and led ultimately to the creation of one of the most feared 
counterterrorist units, GSG-9. The German authorities proved to be effective after 
only five years. 
The so-called German Autumn11 of 1977 drew the world’s attention to 
another international hostage crisis, this time in Mogadishu, Somalia. However, 
prior to the Mogadishu crisis, three major terrorist incidents, two murders and one 
kidnapping, had already placed German officials in a difficult situation. On April 7, 
1977, RAF members killed the chief public prosecutor, Dr. Siegfried Bubeck, and, 
on July 30, Herr Jurgen Ponto, the chairman of Dresdner Bank. Last, on 
September 5, 1977, Dr. Hans Martin Schleyer’s car was ambushed, he was 
kidnapped, and all four bodyguards were shot dead. In return for Schleyer’s 
release, the RAF kidnappers demanded the freedom of their imprisoned 
comrades and DM11 million. Although Chancellor Schmidt refused to negotiate 
at the start, later he used a Swiss lawyer, Denis Payot, to open negotiations with 
the kidnappers, in the hope that this would give them enough time to locate 
Schleyer. Realizing that a support operation was needed to persuade the 
German government to release their prisoners, the RAF asked a radical PFLP 
member, Zuhoir Akache (otherwise known as Captain Mahmoud), to mount an 
operation against a Lufthansa Boeing 737, Flight LH 181, en route from Majorca 
to Frankfurt (Taillon, 2002, pp. 125–126). 
 
                                            
11 Deutscher Herbst in German. This was a sequence of major events in September and 
October that marked the end of the RAF’s first generation. For more information visit: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2340095.stm. Last accessed on October 6, 2005 
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2. The Case 
On October 13, 1977, four Palestinians, two men and two women, 
hijacked the Lufthansa airplane with eighty-six passengers and five 
crewmembers on board. They ordered the crew to land at Leonardo da Vinci 
Airport in Rome, where Captain Mahmoud issued their demands: the release of 
the RAF prisoners in West Germany. At the request of Werner Maihofer, the 
West German interior minister, the Italian authorities tried to delay the aircraft. 
Meanwhile, Chancellor Schmidt established a crisis management group 
authorized to make all necessary decisions. The commander of GSG 9, Lt. Col. 
Wegener, was also informed and a counterterrorist unit was alerted.  
Schmidt then sought international support from James Callaghan, the 
British prime minister, who recommended that he not release the prisoners. In 
the meantime, the Palestinian terrorists threatened to blow up the aircraft if the 
Italian authorities did not provide the requested fuel.   
At 5:42 p.m., the airplane left Rome and headed for Larnaca, Cyprus. 
There, the hijackers demanded that Turkey release two Palestinian prisoners. At 
10:50 p.m. the airplane headed to Beirut, but the authorities refused it permission 
to land. After futile attempts to land at Damascus, Amman, and Kuwait, the pilot 
got permission to land temporarily in Bahrain. During that halt, between 1:52 a.m. 
and 3:24 a.m., Captain Mahmoud sent his demands through Denis Payot, the 
negotiator employed by Schleyer’s kidnappers. Mahmoud set a deadline, 8:00 
a.m., October 16: If it was not met, he threatened that all the hostages, including 
Dr. Schleyer, would be killed (Taillon, 2002, pp. 126–127). 
 At the beginning of the crisis, the German authorities had sent specialists 
with an aircraft to Cyprus. The delegation included the head of the Federal Office 
of Criminal Investigation anti-terror department, foreign office specialists, anti-
terror experts from the interior ministry, agents from German internal and 
external intelligence services, Lufthansa specialists, a GSG-9 command group, 
and a commando element. The Germans staged themselves at the British base 
at Akrotiri, just 55 miles from Larnaca. This was a significant development in the 
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hostage crisis, for it was the first time that the German authorities and the 
terrorists were in the same area at the same time. The German authorities saw it 
as an opportunity to launch an assault on the hostage takers, but the Cypriot 
government denied their request, and the aircraft was able to refuel and depart 
without incident (p. 127). 
Around 6:00 a.m. on October 14, the Lufthansa 737 arrived in Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), where the terrorists requested drink, food, and a 
negotiator. Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktum, the defense minister, who 
took charge as the chief negotiator, asked the hijackers to release any young or 
elderly passengers in exchange for fuel. Although the terrorists refused, they 
exposed themselves later when they needed to replace a broken airpower unit 
on the aircraft. German mechanics were sent in, but as they approached the 
plane, they attempted to contact the crew. Captain Mahmoud, recognizing their 
accent as German, started to fire at them with a handgun. No one was hurt, 
however, and the German aircrew, who now realized that the terrorists did not 
have automatic weapons, informed the German authorities. Following this leak, 
the aircrew transmitted another coded message indicating that there were only 
four hijackers on board, information that was critical to the execution of a rescue 
operation.  
As noted above, Chancellor Schmidt had asked assistance from Great 
Britain. Now, in light of the historical relationship between Britain and Dubai, the 
Germans asked the British authorities to use their influence to persuade the 
Dubai officials to approve a GSG-9 action, should an opportunity present itself. 
The British agreed to help and, in addition, sent two experienced Special Air 
Service members, Major Alastair Morrison and Sergeant Barry Davies, to assist 
in any technical, tactical, or diplomatic issues. 12   
Nonetheless, several problems arose during the GSG-9 preparations, 
which prevented the Germans from launching a rescue operation. First, the 
                                            
12 Wegener and two of his personnel were under local police close watch. The SAS 
members proved to solve this occurrence, and quickly initiated the training for siege-breaking 
(p.129).      
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relationship between Jurgen Wischnewski, the German state minister who was 
acting as liaison for the German crisis group, and Rashid Al-Maktum, the Dubai 
defense minister, began to deteriorate after Wegener remarked, in effect, that the 
UAE squad was useless.13 Second, a German government representative 
revealed that a GSG-9 team had been sent to Cyprus, which caused the 
hijackers to attempt a return to Bonn. The German news media, however, helped 
officials to trick Mahmoud into believing that the GSG-9 group had returned to 
Cologne, a trick that averted the highjackers’ departure. Finally, during the night 
of October 15–16, the plane’s power generator collapsed, and the terrorists 
feared that a rescue force would storm the aircraft. At 5:30 a.m., Mahmoud 
insisted that the plane be refueled or he would kill the pilot, Jurgen Schumann. 
He then asked the pilots to take off an hour before the deadline.  
When the Boeing 737 approached the Aden airport without Yemeni 
permission, Schumann was forced to land on a rough airstrip parallel to the 
blocked runway.  Schumann asked to refuel the airplane and was allowed to 
check the landing gear. Though Yemeni soldiers immediately seized him, they 
later allowed him to return to the aircraft. In the meantime, Mahmoud had been 
influenced by a radio report, and immediately after Shumann’s return, executed 
him for passing information to the Yemeni authorities (Antokol, Nudell, 1990, p. 
78). Mahmoud then ordered the co-pilot, Jurgen Vietor, to fly the short distance 
to Mogadishu, Somalia.  
Once there, Mahmoud demanded that Mogadishu release all RAF 
prisoners by 3:00 p.m. or he would blow up the jet. In a desperate move, Minister 
Wischnewski told the terrorists that Germany had agreed to meet all the 
terrorists’ demands. Mahmoud responded by moving the deadline to 2:45 p.m., 
October 18.   With the assistance of the Somali Air Force,14 a GSG-9 group and 
thirty medical personnel arrived at Mogadishu at 7:30 p.m., in a special Lufthansa 
                                            
13 During a combined training, UAE military were uncooperative by refusing to cut the source 
of power to a Gulf Air 727 (p. 130)  
14 Wegener asked the Somali Air Force commander to cover the GSG-9 landing. The Somali 
Air Force employed some of their fighters in the next hours as the GSG-9 approached (Taillon, 
2002, p. 132).  
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707 (Thompson, 1986, p. 30). That same evening, following a phone call with 
Chancellor Schmidt, Somali President Siad Barre approved a rescue operation. 
Earlier, Mahmoud had dumped Schumann’s body on the runway, a disrespectful 
act on Muslim soil, because Shumann was a Christian. It had a dramatic affect 
on the Somali government, alienating them from the goals of the hijackers. Thus, 
the German authorities became convinced that a rescue operation was 
necessary (Taillon, 2002, 131). 
With Somali support, Wegener and a Somali Armed Forces (SAF) officer 
carried out reconnaissance in the area and formulated a plan. As soon as the 
GSG-9 group arrived, Wegener briefed his teams and moved them into position. 
By 11:30 p.m., their preparations were complete. During this same time, 
Wischnewski had a final conversation with Chancellor Schmidt, who approved 
the operation. (Interestingly, right after the GSG-9 arrived, an Israeli journalist 
reported in a radio transmission that antiterrorism units were ready to attempt a 
rescue [Taillon, 2002, p.132].)  
3. The Seven-minute Rescue 
Wegener took command and was responsible for conducting the 
operation. His only concern was having intelligence information about the 
terrorists at the time of the assault. He arranged sniper teams on the surrounding 
hills, so he would know at all times what was happening in the aircraft. He also 
staged the Somali troops to make a diversion in front of the aircraft to deflect 
attention from the GSG-9 attack (2:05 a.m.), hoping it would cause the terrorists 
to run toward the cockpit. But the assault teams experienced technical difficulties.  
The team members with radios found communication difficult due to the high 
humidity. And the rescue group’s ladders were too long for the aircraft (Taillon, 
2002, p. 133). 
Despite those difficulties, the rescue operation became one of the 
smoothest and fastest on record. Around 2:00 a.m. the Somali SAF soldiers 
started to fire in front of the cockpit. The reconnaissance team simultaneously 
reported that two terrorists were in the cockpit. As part of the deception plan, the 
negotiators distracted Mahmoud by opening a new phase of negotiations, 
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drawing his attention away from the incipient attack. At 2:05 a.m. the code signal 
“Magic Fire” was given, rescuers threw three stun grenades toward the cockpit, 
and six teams stormed the aircraft through all entrances and the emergency 
exits. When the gunfire began, two terrorists were killed instantly. Lethally 
wounded by a Smith Wesson revolver, Mahmoud managed to throw two 
Russian-type grenades. They rolled under the seats, which significantly reduced 
the explosion. The fourth terrorist, a woman, was killed when she was found in a 
toilet. After just four minutes of fighting, the rescuers evacuated the hostages out 
the rear exits, where a reserve team assured that no hijackers were hidden 
among them. By 2:12 a.m., the terrorists were dead with just three out of ninety 
hostages slightly wounded. At 2:17 a.m., rescuers sent the code “springtime” to 
Minister Wischnewski: the mission had ended. At 2: 18 a.m., the hostages were 
sent to a medical station set up at the terminal (Taillon, 2002, pp. 134–135).  
4. A Brief Analysis 
The success of the rescue operation depended on numerous factors. The 
international support, especially the Somali and British assistance, was crucial. 
Intelligence information, deception tactics, and the element of surprise all 
contributed significantly to the final outcome. The Somali government allowed the 
GSG-9 team to operate with Somali troops under a German commander. More 
important, Minister Wischnewski did not interfere in any tactical decisions and 
allowed Wegener to have all the necessary resources (Taillon, 2002, pp. 136–
137).  
Although the GSG-9 operators were highly trained professionals, they 
nonetheless had technical difficulties with their radios and the ladders used, 
which forced them to adapt to the ongoing situation. And they were lucky. No one 
could have known that grenades, once thrown, would explode under seats. Had 
they not, the result would have been completely different, perhaps with a large 




5. Crisis Management Procedures 
As stated in Chapter II, this analysis will focus on requirements that 
present the greatest risk to hostages during a hostage crisis and that revolve 
around the rescue operation. 
a.  Security and Medical Measures 
In this case, the nature of the self-contained aircraft and the 
secured airports meant that there was no need to establish a security perimeter 
(cordon). The most crucial aspect was the cooperation between the German 
authorities and the other governments at all levels. At each airport where the 
hijacked aircraft landed, the authorities made good use of their assets to secure 
and delay the aircraft, thereby helping the German authorities gain more time to 
prepare the rescue operation. What seemed vital in this case was the fact that 
the terrorists could neither leave the aircraft nor get reinforcements.  
The Somali government contributed greatly to the rescue operation.  
Though it took an international effort to encourage the Somali authorities to allow 
GSG-9 to operate on their soil, the activities coordinated with the Somali forces 
proved to be very efficient. First, the hijacked aircraft was moved to a position 
right in front of the control tower. This site was preferable not only because it 
offered a complete view of the airplane, but also because it was near the sand 
dunes that would hide the GSG-9 approach (Taillon, 2002, 131). Second, the 
Somali Air Force used their fighters to cover up the GSG-9 team’s arrival at the 
airport. Finally, SAF troops successfully deceived the terrorists by firing in front of 
the airplane, thus helping the GSG-9 teams to storm the plane. 
As to the medical measures involved, the German authorities 
prepared for a worst-case scenario. They sent thirty German medical personnel, 
who were responsible for setting up a medical station at the terminal as soon as 
they arrived. Luckily, these preparations were ultimately unnecessary; the medics 
needed only to treat the few wounded hostages. They treated most of them 
simply for shock. 
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b.  Negotiations. Stalling for Time 
Without fuel, food, or drinks, the terrorists were forced at all times to 
negotiate. Although they refused attempts to release any of the hostages, they 
were delayed by subsequent negotiators. Moreover, the negotiations with 
Captain Mahmoud allowed GSG-9 to gather critical information about the 
terrorists in a very short time. These various negotiations enabled Minister 
Wischnewski to spend enough time negotiating with Captain Mahmoud that he 
actually, to some degree, gained his trust, a factor that later proved essential to 
the operation. Mahmoud remained on the phone with Wischnewski during the 
initial minutes of the assault because he believed Wischnewski’s assurances that 
there was no rescue operation, though he could hear the SAF gunfire.  
c. Handling the Media 
Of all these factors, the media appears to be the aspect that had 
the most impact on the hostages. Antokol and Nudell (1990) indicate that 
“democratic governments generally have not been successful in establishing 
working relations with the media which allow both government and journalists to 
do their jobs without jeopardizing the lives of hostages” (p. 176). This precise 
dynamic was involved in the only hostage death in the crisis. The terrorists heard 
a radio report that Schumann had provided information to the Yemeni authorities. 
The Yemeni government had been unable to prevent the broadcast, which 
subsequently prompted Mahmoud to kill Schumann as soon as he returned to 
the aircraft. Even before this incident, a German government representative had 
revealed important information about the counterterrorism unit, which resulted in 
the aircraft’s premature departure from Rome. The Israeli radio transmission, 
which could have endangered the entire mission, is another example of the 
media’s detrimental affect on the German plan. Had the terrorists heard the 
broadcast, it would have had a disastrous impact on the whole operation. At each 
of these points, indiscriminate media coverage endangered the lives of the 




B.  CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES FOR SAS IN OPERATION 
NIMROD, LONDON, ENGLAND, 1980 
1.   Background 
Great Britain had and has greater issues in countering terrorism than 
Germany. For more than three decades, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has 
challenged the British government15 over the northern district of Ulster, where the 
majority of the population is Protestant. Since the late 1960s, the IRA’s end 
objective has been to end British rule in Northern Ireland and to join the Republic 
of Ireland, which gained independence in 1920. For that, the IRA has killed more 
than 1,800 people, of which more than 650 were civilians. The IRA varied its 
targets, from British troops and police officers to judges and informers in Ulster.  
They also used hostage-taking tactics, though mostly to persuade the hostages’ 
family members to first transport explosives to military facilities and then to set off 
the bombs. The British government had to be prepared for this type of operation, 
therefore, wherever and whenever it occurred. 
Shifting from Britain’s domestic policies to its foreign policy, Great Britain 
has long been sensitive to the international impact of the Iranian Revolution.  
British policy makers had multiple reasons to be upset with Khomeini’s16 anti-
Western campaign. Prior to Iran’s occupation of the U.S. embassy in Teheran, 
there were many Iranian attacks on the British embassy in Iran that featured 
Molotov cocktails and drive-by shootings. Subsequently, all British diplomats 
were withdrawn. In addition, Iran’s anti-Western discourse prompted Great 
Britain to cancel its economic investment in Iran (DeYoung, 1988, 1; Marshall, 
1988, p. 3). 
                                            
15 Also called Provisional IRA or the Provisionals, they apparently ceased fire after the April 
1998 accord (Good Friday accord) where the main political parties from Ireland, Great Britain, 
and Northern Ireland relinquished violence, freed prisoners, and created a new legislative body in 
Northern Ireland. However IRA has been accused for a Belfast bank robbery in December 2004, 
and because of that they did not disarm but promised they will keep cease-fire agreements. 
Information retrieved on 22 October from: http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/ira.html. For 
more detailed information about IRA read The IRA: A history by Tim Pat Coogan (1990) or The 
Great Shame by Thomas Keneally (2000). 
16 The religious leader, Ayatollah Rubollah Khomeini, coordinated an Islamic revolution in 
Iran in January 1979 and declared an Islamic Republic of Iran in April 1979 after he gained 
military support in February 1979. Information retrieved on 22 October from:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/1/newsid_2521000/2521003.stm  
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2. The Case  
On April 30, 1980, six anti-Khomeini militants armed with submachine 
guns and grenades stormed the Iranian embassy in London. A separatist group 
called the Arabistan Independence Movement took twenty-six hostages, 
including two British soundmen from the BBC and a British police officer, Trevor 
Lock, who was on duty at the embassy entrance. At 11:45, just thirty minutes 
after the ordeal began, Dusty Gray, an ex-SAS member, believing that their 
assistance would be required in the near future, notified SAS headquarters in 
Hereford (Strawson, 1984, p. 221). Before he was taken by the terrorists, 
Constable Lock had managed to alert the Metropolitan police (Met), so the anti-
terrorist squad, C13, and the technical support branch, C7, set up surveillance 
and control points. A Met D11 unit also set up a cordon around the embassy 
(Thompson, 1986, p. 33).  
Around this time, the leader of the separatists, Oan Ali Mohammed 
(Salim), issued the group’s demands, which included the independence of 
Arabistan, the southern Iranian province of Khuzestan, the release of ninety-one 
Arab prisoners in Iranian jails, and safe conduct to Arab countries. Since Britain 
had no authority covering the first two demands, on the second day Oan 
managed to talk with Sadegh Ghotzbadegh, Iran’s Foreign Minister. 
Ghotzbadegh was convinced that Oan was an instrument of American foreign 
policy and refused to comply with his demands, stating that it would be an honor 
for hostages to die for the Iranian revolutionary movement. Soon afterward, the 
Iranian government announced that Britain, Iraq, and Israel were responsible for 
the London crisis and emphasized that Iran would never negotiate with hostage 
takers (Nudell & Antokol, 1990, 109; Davies, 2003, p. 199). To some extent, this 
was true, since Iraqis had trained and paid the assailants, who were sent to 
London with Iraqi passports (Connor, 2000, p. 157).   
By the second day, the Iranians had released two of the hostages who 
were sick. An ambulance arrived to take charge of them. The second hostage 
released, Chris Cramer, a BBC soundman, gave the police important information 
about the terrorists and their location in the building. Meanwhile, an SAS B 
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squadron, a Pagoda troop, moved to the Regents Park barracks where they 
began to train for and rehearse a rescue plan. At the same time, the SAS 
commander, Mike Rose, and some antiterrorist specialists in civilian clothes 
obtained information on the embassy and its surroundings for making a scale 
model. During the night, a tactical support team revealed that a skylight over the 
embassy rooftop could be opened. These details are important because, 
throughout the crisis, they saw only the official police cordon, which was a critical 
factor in the mission’s success. Even though more than two hundred journalists 
were at the scene, the SAS managed to prepare the rescue without detection. 
From the beginning of the crisis, a crisis management cell called COBRA 
(Cabinet Office Briefing Room), under home secretary, William Whitelaw, 
developed the first course of action. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher already 
knew that the assailants would not leave the country. Therefore, police 
negotiators made all the efforts for a peaceful resolution and persuaded the 
hostage takers to reduce their demands. By the fourth day, the assailants had 
reduced their demands to only one: safe passage to Arab countries. In 
subsequent Whitehall meetings, the home secretary invited Arab ambassadors to 
assist him in finding a solution. At the outset of the crisis, Whitelaw had decided 
that the SAS would not get involved in the situation unless two hostages had 
been killed. Their logic was that, even if a first hostage was killed, whether by 
accident or intention, a peaceful surrender could still be negotiated, but if a 
second were killed, the peace option would be ruled out (Connor, 2000, p. 159).  
On the morning of the third day, Oan became very frustrated because his 
demands had not been broadcast. He had promised that two additional hostages 
would be released after the broadcasting of his statement. The group’s demands 
were broadcast that evening on the nine o’clock news and the two hostages were 
freed (Davies, 2003, p. 200).  
In the following two days the police managed to keep control of the 
terrorists by adopting a sympathetic negotiating approach, thereby trying to gain 
the SAS troops more time. But there was little movement toward resolving the 
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crisis, either positively or negatively. On May 5, however, the situation worsened. 
Oan threatened that he would start killing hostages. After a dispute with one 
hostage, Abbas Lavasani, a press attaché, Oan shot him dead at 1:31 p.m. At 
this time, the police negotiators tried to convince Oan that a bus would take them 
to the airport. The SAS teams were in position by 3:50 p.m. waiting for the launch 
order. Around 6:30 p.m., three shots were heard and Lavasani’s body was 
pushed out of the embassy. This was the SAS’s first proof that a hostage had 
been killed, even though, after hearing shots earlier, they had suspected it.  With 
this proof, Whitelaw obtained Thatcher’s approval for the rescue operation. At 
7:07 p.m. Assistant Commissioner John Dellow handed over tactical control of 
the operation to Rose (Connor, 2000, p. 160; Davies, 2003, p. 201).  
3. The Eleven-minute Rescue 
At 7:23 p.m., Operation Nimrod was launched. With the main assault team 
attacking from the rear, the SAS stormed the embassy from three directions.  
The hostage takers were located on all three floors and the hostages on the 
second floor. With flame charges and stun grenades, assault teams entered the 
building and cleared each room of the building from top to bottom. On the first 
floor, Oan was still speaking with the police negotiator, but, after hearing the 
blasts, he ran toward a window to see what was happening. He saw an SAS 
operator at the front window, was tackled by constable Lock, and was killed by 
the operator. Realizing that the embassy was being assaulted, the two terrorists 
in the telex room started shooting at the hostages, killing one and injuring two 
others. Just before the SAS members got to them, they threw down their 
weapons (on the advice of the hostages); but when they were identified, they 
were killed instantly. The terrorist located on the ground floor was shot dead 
before he could open fire.  
While the SAS operators searched for the other two terrorists, a trooper 
noticed a man with a grenade in his hand. He hit him in the back of his neck and 
two SAS members shot him dead. To make sure that the grenade would not 
harm the hostages, an operator used the assailant’s body to cover the grenade’s 
explosion, which, however, failed to occur. The last hostage taker, Fowzi Nejad, 
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managed to escape with the hostages. But the reception team and police 
immediately identified and arrested him.  The two injured hostages were 
hospitalized along with an SAS operator who got stuck on the rappelling cord and 
received serious burns during the assault (Connor, 2000, pp. 161–163; 
Strawson, 1984, pp. 222–223; Davies, 2003, pp. 201–202). 
4. A Brief Analysis 
The crisis cell seemed to solve the problem without the support of the 
Iranian authorities. From the beginning, Whitelaw knew that, eventually, an 
armed response would be necessary, but he believed that the assailants could 
be influenced to surrender. Whitelaw later noted that the hostage rescue 
proceeded as smoothly as an exercise because the Cabinet had been practicing 
such operations in anticipation of an IRA hostage-taking (Taillon, 2002, pp. 71–
72).  Thatcher made the ultimate decision about what should be done, but in an 
excellent example of decentralized command and control, like Chancellor 
Schmidt, she did not interfere in the operational or tactical decisions. She left 
tactical decisions to Whitelaw, who, in turn, delegated the power and the 
decisions about necessary resources to Rose.  
As seen from a tactical perspective, the operation encountered only a 
small number of problems. A lack of intelligence about the terrorists and 
hostages prior to the assault almost killed one of the operators when constable 
Lock intervened (Connor, 2000, p. 165). Furthermore, while the swift assault did 
not allow Oan to order the execution of the hostages, they remained vulnerable. 
The two terrorists in the telex room had enough time to kill one and injure two 
others. Undoubtedly, the terrorists could have killed all of them within seconds. 
Only the hostages and their ability to convince their captors that they would be 
arrested persuaded them to drop their weapons.  
Obviously, a capture of terrorists could lead to other terrorist incidents, as 
the British experience with the IRA and the German experience with the RAF 
confirmed.  In this regard, many local witnesses believed that Thatcher ordered 
the SAS to kill all the hostage takers (BBC, 1980). However, police evidence 
showed that the assailants were armed when the SAS operators killed them 
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(Connor, 2000, p. 165; Strawson, 1984, p. 222). Leroy Thompson (1986) argues 
“that once the terrorists started killing hostages, they were justifiably ‘bought and 
paid for,’ and anyone not willing to admit that is very naive about terrorists and 
murderers of any ilk” (p. 37). All together, what made this rescue operation a 
successful one was not the killing of the assailants, but the fact that almost all of 
the hostages were free. 
5. Crisis Management Procedures 
a. Security and Medical Measures 
The police forces had a chance to secure the area before anyone 
could reach the Iranian embassy, especially the Press. This could be attributed in 
large part to Trevor Lock, who alerted the police. As in the German case, the 
police effectively isolated the hostage-takers. During the hostage crisis, the only 
individuals who could approach the embassy were medics (ambulances) who 
treated the released hostages. Indeed, the police helped the assault teams to 
reach their initial positions, using their surveillance teams to give them 
information on the terrorists’ movements. The security forces helped the 
reception team in identifying the last assailant, arresting him before he could 
harm anyone.  
b.  Negotiations. Stalling for Time 
This case was a classic example of authorities stalling for time in 
order to prepare an assault to rescue hostages. For six days, the police 
negotiators, without responding to their demands, persuaded the assailants not 
to kill any hostages. This enabled the negotiators to reduce the hostage takers’ 
expectations, while also allowing the SAS to gather more intelligence on both the 
assailants and the hostages. Moreover, they managed to release six hostages, 
thus reducing the number of hostages at risk. More important, the negotiators 
kept Oan in a detail-coping mode by concentrating on details that would help the 
assailants leave the country unharmed. At the moment of the assault, Oan was 
preoccupied with details for the requested bus. This gave the assault teams time 
to start clearing the rooms and prevented hostage bloodshed.  
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One could argue that the negotiators could have prevented 
Lavasani’s execution. Knowing the assailants’ behavior, the police could have 
proposed a rescue operation on the last night of negotiations. As the decision 
makers knew that an armed intervention would be required, the question 
remains: why didn’t they send the assault teams before Lavasani was killed? The 
intelligence information about the hostage takers and hostages was the same 
before and after the execution. Had they stormed the embassy the night before, 
they could have saved one more life.  They did not choose the assault option at 
that time because of their fear that it would put the hostages further at risk. Once 
the captors begun to execute hostages, however, the calculations changed, 
turning to that of preventing further loss of life.  
c.  Handling the Media 
Unlike the German case, in this incident both the decision makers 
and the police negotiators coped very well with the media. The authorities 
managed to keep the press informed about details that would not affect a later 
decision to storm the building. This is a perfect example of the technique of 
regularly briefing the media so that they will think they are being kept abreast of 
all developments, which makes it less likely that they will investigate the situation 
and uncover other preparations that are going on (Antokol, Nudell, 1990, pp. 78–
79). This tactic is critical for operational secrecy. It allowed the police and later 
the SAS to move into their initial and surveillance positions without media 
exposure, which would have compromised the operation. The presence of the 
assault teams and their plan to rescue the hostages was not disclosed to the 
media until the actual assault.  Although reporters managed to give a live 
broadcast of the rescue operation, they did not cover the main assault from the 
rear, which means they were not aware of the whole operation. Finally, the police 
negotiators kept the reporters from interviewing the hostage takers. Given the 
fact that the media had broadcast the terrorists’ demands by only the third day, 
the denial of interviews demonstrated again that the government maintained 
control of the situation. 
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C.  CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES FOR PERUVIAN SPECIAL 
FORCES IN OPERATION CHAVIN DE HUANTAR, LIMA, PERU, 1997 
1.   Background 
On May 13, 1982, the Peruvian government had to deal for the first time 
with Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA).17  The Amaru 
revolutionary movement developed from a series of negotiations among several 
leftist groups. Its basic goals were to establish a Marxist regime and to rid Peru of 
all imperialist elements, mainly U.S. and Japanese influence. For almost fifteen 
years, with no more than six hundred fighters, MRTA conducted bombings, 
kidnappings, ambushes and assassinations (Davies, 2003, p. 57). The 
movement’s targets varied from government officials and businessmen to military 
and police installations.  
In addition, to gain popular support, they planned numerous attacks 
(kidnappings) against media elements. In February 1984, MRTA kidnapped 
newscast personnel from the Radio Imperial and Radio Independencia radio 
stations, forcing them to broadcast MRTA’s intention to overthrow the 
government. In June 1985, MRTA transmitted its first underground radio 
message by intercepting and using the Channel 5 audio signal. In February 
1987, MRTA members occupied seven radio stations in Lima and confirmed their 
anger at the increasing militarization.  
Since 1989, the Peruvian government had managed to pinpoint some 
MRTA locations and developed new measures for use against the guerilla forces. 
In February 1989, the Peruvian police captured the movement leader, Victor 
Polay Campos, imprisoning him in Canto Grande prison in Lima. However, in 
July 1990, Campos and forty-six other MRTA members managed to escape from 
prison through a 315-meter underground tunnel. On April 28, 1989, military 
forces surrounded a MRTA unit and, after heavy fighting, including air bombings, 
sixty-two insurgents were captured and killed.  
                                            
17 They named themselves after an eighteenth-century leader, who confronted Spanish 
colonial rule. That leader had taken the name Tupac Amaru, who was the last ruler of the Incan 
empire. 
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After President Fujimori was elected in 1990, the military struggle against 
the guerillas was much disputed. In 1991, several attacks, including car 
bombings against the ministry of interior and the U.S. embassy, forced Fujimori 
to pass the so-called November Decrees, which amplified the military response 
to the violence in Peru. Relying on the support of two men, the commander of the 
armed forces, General Hermosa Rios, and the director of the ministry of 
intelligence, Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori dissolved the Congress, closed the 
courts, and surrounded Lima with military troops. Following his instigation of a 
coup, Fujimori revised the constitution, created a single-house legislature, and 
reformed the judicial process (Garrison, 2002). In 1992, the arrest of Abimael 
Guzman combined with other captures, helped Fujimori win the following 
elections.18 By 1993, the leadership of MRTA had been captured, including 
Victor Polay Campos and some of his most important lieutenants. In 1996, the 
Peruvian government declared that, with four hundred of its members 
imprisoned, MRTA was no longer a threat. However, Nestor Cerpa Cartollini, the 
most important member of the MRTA hierarchy at the time, promised his 
imprisoned comrades, who included his wife, Nancy Gilbonio that MRTA would 
continue its acts of violence until the prisoners were released. As the leadership 
regrouped, there several factors contributed to a revival of MRTA support: 70 
percent of the Peruvian population was listed as below the poverty line; more 
than 60 percent suffered from malnourishment; and 20 percent of the population 
in urban areas was illiterate, with no skills in either reading or writing (Garrison, 
2002). 
2.  The Case  
On December 17, 1996, fourteen MRTA members entered the Japanese 
embassy during a birthday celebration for the Japanese emperor and took more 
                                            
18 Chairman Gonzalo, the founder and leader of Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path), a 
Maoist terrorist organization that had been trying to bring down the Peruvian state since 1980. 
Information retrieved on 29 October, 2005 from:  http://www.gci275.com/peru/sendero.shtml  
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than six hundred hostages.19  Although the group engaged the embassy security 
forces in a fierce gun battle, there were no deaths and only minor injuries in the 
siege. The timing of the attack was designed to net a group of hostages that 
contained many eminent persons. The celebrants-turned-hostages included 
Peru’s foreign minister, Francisc Tudela; the agriculture minister, Rodolfo 
Munante Sanguineti; and Peru’s supreme court president, Moises Pantoja 
Ambassadors from Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cuba, Panama, Poland, Romania, 
South Korea, Spain, and Venezuela were also present, along with Japan’s 
ambassador, Morihisa Aoki, and his seventeen staff members. MRTA had 
possibly the most eminent hostage list ever.  
The leader of the assailants, Nestor Cerpa, issued their demands in a 
phone call to a local radio station. They included the release of some four 
hundred and fifty prisoners from Peruvian jails; an economic program to help 
Peru’s poor; transfer of the freed prisoners and assailants to a jungle hiding 
place; and payment of an unspecified amount as a war tax. Immediately, a Red 
Cross representative, Michel Mining, tried to negotiate with Cerpa for the release 
of the hostage takers. The hostage takers were unaware that Fujimori’s mother 
and sister were among the first hostages released, though his son would remain 
a hostage until the end of the crisis. Rodolfo Reategui, the commander of the 
Peruvian Navy, escaped with the second group, which comprised waiters and 
other staff. The hostage takers shot at Reategui, but without harming him. At this 
point, the hostages were divided into two main groups, 150 on the first floor and 
the remaining 231 on the second floor. The most highly valued hostages, the 
ambassadors, ministers, state representatives, military leaders, and business 
people, were held on the second floor (Perez, 2004, p. 44). 
Within minutes of the siege, the embassy security forces began to 
implement antiterrorist procedures. By the night of December 18, members of the 
                                            
19 How they entered the embassy has never been established. Some sources state that they 
entered disguised as waiters, others claim that the assailants just rushed over the high concrete 
walls that form the embassy perimeter. However, most agree that there was at least one 
explosion before the hostage takers started shooting and shouting “Viva MRTA,” which marked 
the takeover. Information retrieved on 29 October, 2005 from: http://www.isanet.org/ 
noarchive/garrison.html and Davies, 2003, p. 212. 
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special tactics forces, Sub-Unidad de Acciones Tácticas (SUAT), positioned 
snipers on the nearby rooftops. Meanwhile, Cerpa threatened that he would start 
killing hostages if the authorities did not respond to his demands. But the 
deadlines passed without any harm to the hostages. At the end of the day, MRTA 
released three hostages with medical problems and four diplomats, the 
ambassadors of Canada, Germany, and Greece and the French cultural attaché. 
Cerpa released the diplomats for the explicit purpose of negotiating the situation. 
The diplomats read a statement in which they said that they had been sent to find 
a solution that would avoid any loss of life. The Canadian ambassador, Anthony 
Vincent, proved very useful in providing information about the terrorists. 
President Fujimori disagreed with MRTA’s attempt to negotiate through the 
ambassadors, however. He asserted that the chief negotiator on his behalf was 
still the education minister, Domingo Palermo, assisted by two other negotiators, 
Archbishop Juan Luis Cipriani and the Red Cross representative, Michel Mining.  
During the next two days, the residence’s power and communications 
lines were cut off and five hundred packages of rations were sent to the 
hostages. Representative Mining negotiated for the release of an additional forty-
three hostages, including the president of Nissan Motors. After pressure from 
American and Japanese officials, Fujimori stated that he would not give in to the 
terrorists’ demands, but he would find a solution. At this point, the differences in 
the American and the Japanese positions toward dealing with terrorists began to 
widen. The American authorities suggested that Fujimori should not respond to 
Cerpa’s demands as a means to gain the release of the prisoners. On the other 
hand, the Japanese, who were known for their dealing with terrorists by 
concessions, proposed that any measure should be taken that would assure 
saving lives. There were also rumors that an international rescue force made up 
of U.S. Special Forces, SAS, and Israeli Special Forces was being sent to 
support the Peruvian authorities. These press rumors contributed to the release 
of seven American hostages. On December 22, two hundred and twenty-five 
hostages were released, leaving a hundred and three, mostly Peruvian and 
Japanese officials.  
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On December 28, Palermo and two assistants, Cipriani and Mining, met 
with Cerpa to convey the message that Fujimori might grant the hostage takers 
safe passage to a third country in exchange for the remaining hostages. Cerpa 
then released another twenty hostages and called for better conditions in 
Peruvian jails, but he did not discuss the MRTA prisoners. As the negotiations 
began to improve the situation, journalists were allowed to take close-up 
photographs. Subsequently, another seven hostages were released. On 
December 31, however, the situation worsened when a Japanese journalist 
sprinted toward the residence in an attempt to gain an interview with Cerpa. 
Cerpa used this as an opportunity to send a message rejecting Fujimori’s offer to 
Fujimori and the public: “If I had wanted to leave, I could have left clandestinely, 
as surely many dedicated people have done.  We reiterate our request that our 
comrades be liberated” (Garrison, 2002).  
After seeing the broadcast, Fujimori stated that he would make no other 
offer. He also appointed replacements for some of the official Peruvian hostages, 
including the president of the Supreme Court, the security chief, and the head of 
the anti-terrorist police. By those actions, Fujimori attempted to reassure the 
Peruvians that the hostage crisis would not hold back Peruvian progress. By that 
time, the ongoing Red Cross visits to bring food supplies were the only 
interactions occurring between the two sides. 
After turning down all international offers of counterterrorist rescue forces, 
Fujimori told the public and the Japanese government that a military response 
was not an option. Moreover, he proposed again to offer safe passage to the 
hostage takers. Conversely, he asked MRTA to withdraw its demands and to 
release the remaining four hundred and fifty prisoners. Cerpa again took a hard 
stance, stating that there would be no negotiations unless the Peruvians 
accepted the release of the MRTA prisoners. By January 15, the Peruvian 
government agreed with the proposal, although Fujimori’s committee was still 
debating the issue. Fujimori rejected a proposal that a Guatemalan 
representative be part of the guarantor commission. Although Cerpa stated that 
he would release no hostages, he released Peru’s top antiterrorist policeman and 
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General Jose Rivas Rodriguez, who were both ill. This move would turn out to be 
a big mistake for Cerpa, because General Rodriguez’s information about the 
terrorists would prove crucial in planning the eventual rescue operation.  
Meanwhile, the hostage takers shot at police troops for being too close to 
the residence. No one was hurt, but the policemen then began throwing stones 
into the residence, creating a cycle of violence. The Japanese government 
expressed its fear that some incident might occur that would harm the hostages. 
On January 26, the police set up twelve loudspeakers at the embassy entrance. 
In the following weeks, patriotic hymns were played, which marked the beginning 
of a propaganda battle between MRTA and the police. Actually, the police were 
using the noise to cover the noise made by twenty-four miners from the 
government-owned Centromin mining company who were digging underground 
tunnels toward the embassy (Davies, 2003, p. 216). Realizing that the terrorists 
had mined and booby-trapped the area around the residence, the Peruvian 
Special Forces had decided to storm it from underground.  
The Peruvian forces, a combination of elite forces from both police and 
army units, which had begun training right after Christmas, were under the direct 
command of Gen. Hermosa Rios Montesinos. Montesinos was in charge of the 
intelligence operations, but Fujimori was the commander in chief of all forces. In 
early January, a replica of the embassy residence was constructed at the 
Peruvian Army commando school in El Chorrillo. And, although both the United 
States and Britain denied any direct military assistance to the Peruvian 
authorities, both supplied Peru with experts and intelligence assets. The CIA sent 
an unmanned aircraft with a forward-looking infrared camera, a U.S. Air Force 
RG-8A, to monitor the assailants and their hostages. Britain sent four SAS 
experts to help the Peruvians plan the rescue operation.  
Unaware of the two-way radio hidden inside it, Archbishop Cipriani 
smuggled a guitar into the residence, which reached Vice Admiral Giampetri. 
From that point on, Giampetri transmitted more than thirty massages a day that 
proved vital to the assault plans (Davies, 2003, pp. 214–215; Perez, 2004, p. 80).  
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On February 6, Mining and Cipriani negotiated a medical examination of 
the seventy-two remaining hostages. Fujimori met with the British Prime Minister, 
John Major, who advised him to continue negotiations. On February 9, who 
Japanese reporter, Tsuyoshi Hitomi, who already avoided the perimeter security, 
once again managed to enter the residence and provided the terrorists with radio 
equipment for interviews. There were rumors also that Cerpa had informers from 
outside who kept him informed about the Peruvian authorities’ progress. Partly as 
a result of that, the security cordon moved the press back ten meters from their 
initial location in early April, so they could keep better control over them. 
At the beginning of March, Fujimori visited Cuba to request that Fidel 
Castro offer asylum to the fourteen terrorists. Though he disapproved of MRTA’s 
actions, Castro agreed. No one knows if this was part of a deception plan or of a 
plan to assault the rebels en route. Meanwhile, the terrorists suspected that 
tunnels were being dug under the residence. While the police denied the rumors, 
newspapers published photographs of vehicles removing dirt from the perimeter 
site.  
Fujimori continued to state publicly that a military assault plan was a last 
resort. Some say that the subsequent resignations of the minister of Interior and 
the chief of the Peruvian National Police (PNP) were in protest of the military 
rescue plan. Others say that Fujimori forced them to resign in response to a 
disappointed public and to take responsibility for what would follow. Polls showed 
only 38 percent support for Fujimori’s handling of the crisis, his lowest approval 
rating in his seven years as president (Garrison, 2002). On April 21, Giampetri 
informed some hostages that a rescue was planned and that they should wear 
light-colored clothing so the rescue force could identify them.  
3.   The Thirty-five–minute Rescue 
On April 22 at 2:20 p.m. Giampetri transmitted the code “Mary’s sick,” 
indicating that the hostages were prepared for the rescue operation (Perez, 
2004, pp. 77–78).  At 3:23 p.m. the hostages heard three blows followed by an 
intense explosion. A 140-man commando team emerged from five different 
directions around the residence; rebels found outside playing soccer were killed 
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instantly. Those inside the building were killed as the assault teams cleared the 
rooms. The last terrorist, who had barricaded himself on the second floor, fought 
for over thirty minutes until two commandos rappelled from the rooftop and 
neutralized him with a demolition charge. 
Some hostages later claimed that, after most of hostage takers had been 
killed, the commandos executed three more who had surrendered. During the 
assault, two police officers died, one of whom was a member of the security team 
assigned to protect Fujimori’s son. And one of the hostages, the Supreme Court 
judge, Carlo Giusti Acuna, died from a heart attack after being shot in the leg. 
Among the other seventy-one hostages, twenty-five had minor wounds; two 
others needed surgery. After the assault teams occupied the building, President 
Fujimori took charge of the situation in a televised walk-through.  
4.   A Brief Analysis 
Prior to Fujimori’s decision for a rescue operation, he took into account the 
U.S. and Japanese proposals; but he kept the international support for a rescue 
operation secret from the Peruvian committee. Thus the negotiators and the 
Japanese authorities were unaware of the rescue plan.  The minister of interior 
and the PNP chief resignations also signified that President Fujimori was solely 
accountable for the final decision. However, Fujimori’s decision to storm the 
embassy was known and supported by both Hermoza and Montesinos, allies that 
would eventually contribute to Fujimori’s demise.20  
In defense of their accordance with human rights regulations, the Peruvian 
government reported that all the hostage takers had been annihilated during the 
assault, but TV footage revealed that some of the assailants’ bodies were 
mutilated and even dismembered. In an apparent effort to prevent further 
investigations, the assailants’ corpses were buried in unmarked graves 
                                            
20 The footage and other reports of payoffs and abuses of power contributed to a 19 percent 
rating approval in June 1997, down from the 65 percent that Fujimori had enjoyed right after the 
rescue. The international community did not sanction Fujimori after reports revealed severe 
electoral tampering. Fujimori won the 1998 reelections, but he was forced to remove one of his 
oldest allies, Gen. Hermoza, who opposed the reelection bid. Eventually, in 2000, when 
Montesinos got caught bribing a Congress member, Fujimori resigned and asked asylum in 
Japan. Information retrieved on October 29, 2005, from: 
http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/garrison.html. 
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(Garrison, 2002). This circumstance contributed to the terrible image of the 
Peruvian military. Most of the assault team members were tried by a so-called 
Truth Commission and faced charges of assassination.  
This case demonstrates that the information provided by hostages is 
crucial. Indeed, it enabled the Peruvian forces to plan a rescue operation. Given 
the fact that the MRTA terrorists were expecting an attack by helicopters, the 
underground tunnels maximized the surprise factor. And Fujimori deceived the 
assailants into believing that an airplane would take them into Cuba. The 
Peruvian Special Forces pulled off a rescue that became known as one of the 
most stunning rescue assaults of the decade. 
5.  Crisis Management Procedures 
a.  Security and Medical Measures 
As in the other two cases, after they tried to get the terrorists 
released from the residence, the Peruvian Police secured the perimeter. For a 
hundred and twenty-six days, with few exceptions, they managed to restrain the 
Press and to control the information flow. Later there were incidents between the 
MRTA members and the police cordon that could have cause injuries not only to 
the hostages but also to the police it. Fortunately, those altercations ended when 
the police set up the twelve loudspeakers, with the loud music and patriotic 
hymns that covered the noises made by the miners.  
As far as medical measures are concerned, the Red Cross was 
allowed to visit and treat the hostages. Their visits gave the authorities a bigger 
picture of what was going on inside the embassy. Representative Mining made 
sure through negotiations that if any of the hostages became sick, they would be 
released. Ultimately, after the rescue operation was completed, medics 
immediately treated the twenty-five wounded hostages.  
b. Negotiations. Stalling for Time 
Palermo and his assistants negotiated the release of more than 90 
percent of the hostages. After several days of siege, the negotiators also 
manipulated the hostage takers’ environment, cutting off the communication  
 
38 
systems and the electricity, thereby forcing the assailants to negotiate for them. 
Moreover, during the four-month crisis, the MRTA terrorists eventually released 
hostages in return for food rations.  
Fujimori’s firm position against the release of the 450 MRTA 
prisoners finally brought the terrorists to accept the offer of free passage to Cuba. 
The fact that the hostage takers did not kill any hostages and overlooked the 
deadlines showed that negotiators from inside and outside the residence knew 
how to deal with MRTA and its leader.  
The 126 days of negotiations allowed a rescue force to gather 
intelligence on both the hostage takers and the hostages. It also made the 
assailants more confident in their ability to keep control over the residence. One 
of the key elements in the rescue plan was Vice Admiral Giampetri’s ability to 
supply daily information about the rebels through a concealed two-way radio. 
c. Handling the Media 
President Fujimori’s regime and the international value of the 
hostages attracted many journalists to the scene seeking information on the 
hostage crisis. But letting the journalists stay close to the residence gave one 
Japanese reporter an opportunity to sprint to the residence, not once but twice, 
which broke the Peruvian regime’s control over the information flow. The 
reporter’s interview with Cerpa and the fact that he provided the terrorists with 
radios had a negative impact on the negotiations and worsened the situation. 
Fortunately, none of his actions harmed the hostages. However, the authorities’ 
control of the situation had been reduced.   
The footage of the vehicles removing dirt could have compromised 
the whole operation. Therefore, local authorities must very well protect this type 
of information and all tactical matters linked to a rescue attempt. For instance, 
the journalists could not reach the rescue force’s training compound, but they 




could argue that, since the assailants believed that they were safe as long as 
they did not kill any hostages, any assault could have been detrimental to the 
government.   
Finally, rumors in the local news about an international rescue effort 
made the assailants release most of the hostages, leaving only those with links 
to the Japanese and Peruvian governments. This time the Press scared the 
terrorists, which worked as a deterrent factor, even though they claimed that they 
were releasing hostages as a benevolent Christmas gesture 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented three cases of hostage crises in which the rescue 
operations ended with only minor fatalities. Their focus on crisis management 
procedures allowed the decision makers to reflect before the actual assault. Now 
we discuss some useful lessons drawn from those three crises. 
First, in the initial phase of the crises, local authorities implemented 
antiterrorist measures as soon as possible. To that end, the local/national police 
secured the perimeters and alerted all the necessary players responsible for 
carrying out such processes.  In the cases described, both the decision makers 
and the rescue forces were alerted within minutes. Two cases were embassy 
cases that involved a relationship between a host government and a 
representative government. The German hijacking case involved a relationship 
between a host government and the governments that approved the airplane’s 
landings. Among the three cases, the governmental relationships were structured 
differently, but all had something in common throughout the crises: control of the 
situation. In the British case, although the relationship was made difficult by their 
diverging political stances, the Iranian government eventually agreed with the 
British line of decisions. In the other cases, approval of the rescue operation was 
given either explicitly or, in Peru, tacitly. In additional, their relations favored an 
exchange of information about the hostage-takers’ backgrounds and their modus 
operandi. 
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Second, the cases demonstrated that governments need to control all 
those who speak with hostage takers. In all three cases, a chief negotiator was 
named and he then coordinated with the security forces, the political decision 
makers, and the rescue force commanders. Excepting in the Peruvian case, the 
security forces maintained control over the crowds and the Press, and, most 
important, did not allow the hostage takers to escape or to obtain reinforcements. 
Third, even though none of the three hostage crises required extraordinary 
medical efforts, the authorities managed to get medical treatment for both the 
hostages and the security forces during and after the crises. In the German case, 
in which the military forces were deployed outside their country, more than thirty 
medics were sent to treat potential injured hostages. In the other two cases, 
medical assets were prepared by and employed from local resources.  
Fourth, all the negotiators had the ability to persuade the hostage takers 
not to kill the hostages. In London, assailants killed the press attaché after having 
a political dispute with him; the German pilot’s killing was the fault of the media. 
In both those cases, the negotiators handled the situation well. More important, 
the negotiation tactics provided the authorities time for intelligence gathering. In 
all of the cases, none of the terrorists’ demands were met, and thus they did not 
result in any political changes in the involved countries.   
Finally, in most cases, the host governments managed to prevent the 
media from discovering the tactical details of the hostage rescues. Indeed, it was 
the media that killed the pilot in the German case by revealing the fact that he 
was providing intelligence about the terrorists. Also, in the Peruvian case, the 
Japanese reporter created confusion and caused both the authorities and the 
hostage takers to retract statements pertaining to the negotiation process.  
However, in all cases the media also assisted the governments in deceiving the 
assailants or deterring them from discovering the authorities’ proposed actions. 
For instance, the German authorities deceived the hijackers through a radio 
communication, which stated that the GSG-9 had left Greece and had stopped 
chasing the hostage takers. In the Peruvian case, a local news program 
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announced that international rescue forces were prepared to deploy to Peru, 
which caused the assailants to release all but the hostages related to Japan and 

















































IV. CASE STUDY: HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS WITH 
MAJOR FATALITIES 
A. CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES OF ALPHA AND VYMPEL IN 
THE MOSCOW THEATER: MOSCOW, RUSSIA, 2002 
1. Background 
The Russian-Chechen conflict, which seems new to Americans, actually 
began a century and a half ago. In 1858, the Russian empire conquered the 
region of North Caucasus after a three-decade resistance by Chechen clan 
groups led by Imam Shamil.  A Chechen-Ingush republic was established in 
1934, but in late 1944, Stalin sent 400,000 Ingush and Chechens into exile in 
Central Asia and Siberia for suspected cooperation with the Germans. Under 
President Khrushchev in 1957, the Chechens as well as other deported 
nationalities were allowed to return to their reestablished republics.  
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Chechen president, 
Dzhokhar Dudayev, declared independence, but Boris Yeltsin, the current 
Russian president, refused to recognize Chechnya’s independence. And in late 
1994, assisted by anti-Dudayev groups in Chechnya, 10,000 Russian troops 
invaded Groznyy, the Chechen capital. The struggle escalated until, in April 
1996, Dudayev was killed in a missile attack. Nevertheless, the Chechen 
counteroffensive continued, and, in August 1996, succeeded under the 
leadership of the notorious guerilla leader, Shamil Basaev. Finally, the Chechens 
had won back control of their capital. This led to several agreements between 
Moscow and Groznyy and, by December 1996, had forced the Russians to 
withdraw their troops from Chechnya.  
In January 1997, the Chechens elected Aslan Maskhadovas as their new 
president, who was officially recognized as legitimate by both Moscow and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Throughout the 
following two years Chechnya was very unstable, with widespread lawlessness 
and organized crime. The anarchy reached a climax in December 1998 when 
four Western telecommunications engineers were abducted and decapitated.  
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One of the most noteworthy incidents of the 1994–1996 conflict was a raid 
on the southern Russian town of Budennovsk led by Basaev in June 1995. 
Basaev, with more than eighty Chechen fighters, attacked the local police station 
and seized the main hospital. They took some 1,600 hostages, including doctors 
and patients.  Basaev then demanded that all Russian troops be withdrawn from 
Chechnya. The next day, Russian Special Forces attempted to rescue the 
hostages, but they managed to seize only the ground floor. After Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin called to agree to a ceasefire, Basaev released 227 hostages. A 
second assault failed to bring the Chechens out of the hospital compound and, 
during the assaults, over a hundred hostages died and more than four hundred 
were wounded. Finally, after a six-day standoff Chernomyrdin guaranteed 
Basaev safe passage to Chechnya in exchange for the rest of hostages. This 
event greatly embarrassed the Russian government, which proudly asserted that 
there would be no more terrorist attacks on Russian territory.  
In 1999, the Russians were famously proven wrong when Basaev once 
again instigated conflict, creating a situation of violence throughout Chechnya 
and the neighboring countryside. Though he was not a government official, 
Basaev imposed Islamic law in Chechnya through his network of armed guerillas. 
The government was powerless to stop Basaev in this, and they could not rein 
him in when, in August, he led radical Chechen groups in a failed attempt to take 
control of the neighboring Russian territory of Dagestan. But when several car-
bombings in Moscow were also attributed to Basaev’s group, the events forced 
President Yeltsin and the then–prime minister, Vladimir Putin, to send 100,000 
Russian troops to recapture Dagestan and reestablish order in Chechnya. The 
offensive drove the rebels into the mountainous areas and more than 250,000 
Chechen refugees into Ingushetia.  
By 2000, the newly elected President Putin’s government continued the 
military operations, now described as “anti-terrorist operations,” and the Federal 
Security Service (FSB) was given control. Although a settlement was reached at 
the end of 2001, today Russian troops have still not been withdrawn from 
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Chechnya. And Russia’s number one enemy, Shamil Basaev, has claimed 
responsibility for two sensational hostage takings. 
2. The Case 
On October 23, 2002, at 8:15 in the evening, forty Chechen terrorists, 
nineteen women and twenty-one men, stormed a Moscow theater and took more 
than eight hundred hostages. The hostages were watching the second act of the 
Russian musical Nord Ost, which was to become the colloquial name for the 
siege and subsequent hostage crisis, known to the international community as 
the siege of Dubrovka. After the Chechens fired several times on the stage, they 
rounded everyone up in the auditorium and placed explosives around the 
building. The nineteen Chechen women wearing bomb belts were positioned in 
the audience: at the leader’s order, they would explode the charges. Movsar 
Barayev, who assumed leadership of the terrorists, issued a statement that they 
would start executing hostages unless the Russian authorities ordered an end to 
the war in Chechnya. No deadline was set for carrying out the threats, but 
Barayev stated that the assailants could hold out for a week. 
Barayev was very well known, not only for fighting against the Russians in 
Chechnya, but also because of his uncle’s reputation. Arbi Barayev, a Chechen 
warlord, was famous for the 1998 kidnapping and beheading of the four 
engineers, three Britons and a New Zealander. Barayev’s renewed activity 
embarrassed the Russian authorities. They had claimed that he was killed in 
Chechnya ten days earlier. This and the fact that more than seventy hostages 
were international citizens soon attracted the media’s attention (HBO, 2004; 
Davies, 2003, p. 221).  
Although police quickly surrounded the theater, they gave very little 
information to the media. The assailants, unhappy with the lack of media 
attention, told the hostages to use their cell phones to call their families, the 
media, and the government. One hostage called radio station Ekho Moskvy, 




that, all radio stations and TV channels became focused on the hostage crisis; 
and, despite the government’s attempt to control the flow of information, word 
spread quickly to the outside world.  
From the start the authorities were resistant to the terrorists’ demands. 
Knowing full well how the authorities usually responded to such situations, the 
hostages and their families expressed considerable fear that the authorities 
would storm the theater, ending the crisis with a bloodbath. As things turned out, 
their fears were completely justified, though in a very different way than they had 
anticipated.  
The FSB chief, Nikolai Patrushev, after consulting with President Putin, 
presented the government’s offer: free passage from Russia. Barayev refused, 
declaring that the hostage takers were prepared to die with the hostages, though 
he released forty-one hostages, Muslims, children, and a pregnant woman, as a 
sign of his goodwill. Russian security forces questioned the released hostages 
about the hostage takers’ positions in the theater. In the meantime, Putin 
cancelled scheduled trips to Germany, Portugal, and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum (APEC) summit in Mexico, where he was scheduled to meet 
with President Bush (Davies, 2003, p. 222; CBC, 2002).  
Astonishingly, after six hours of the siege, a twenty-six-year-old shop 
assistant who lived nearby entered in the theater. No one knew how she 
managed to pass through the police cordon. Claiming that the terrorists were 
“just some clowns” and the hostage taking was “just a masquerade,” she told the 
hostages to leave immediately. The rebels, believing she was an FSB spy, 
pushed her down the auditorium stairs and shot her (HBO, 2004).  
After rejecting the government negotiators, the rebels demanded that 
Grigorii Yavlinsky, leader of the Russian opposition party, Yabloko, should come 
to the negotiations table.  Yavlinsky, they said, would be more neutral, because 
he had often condemned Russia’s military actions in Chechnya. Yavlinsky 
promised to arrive on October 24. In the meantime, Barayev allowed a number of 
politicians — the former president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev; the former 
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Russian prime minister, Yevghenii Primakov; and the leader of the Union of Right 
Forces, Boris Nemtsov — into the theater to open the negotiations. Nemtsov was 
able to talk by phone with the hostage takers. A journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, 
also played a key role, and Barayev allowed a pediatric physician, Leonid 
Roshal, to treat the hostages (Dunlop, 2004).  
The rebels, however, did not have a coherent negotiation position, a 
circumstance that altered the negotiations process. Yavlinsky stated that they 
wanted the Russian troops out of Chechnya immediately, and when the 
negotiators proposed that the rebels release hostages for each peaceful day in 
Chechnya, they agreed. However, when the negotiators reminded them that 
October 23 had been a peaceful day in Chechnya, the rebels said they must talk 
to Basaev or Maskhadov. The reporter, Politkovskaya, and the Right Forces 
leader, Nemtsov, stated that the rebels were not highly educated and did not 
know how to negotiate gradually. Yavlinsky told Putin that a step-by-step 
negotiation remained possible, but by October 25 he suspected that Putin had 
his own, quite different solution for the crisis. Politkovskaya then discovered that, 
at the operations headquarters, ministry of interior representatives and FSB 
officers were debating whether to continue negotiations until exhausted the 
assailants were exhausted or to assault the theater (Dunlop, 2004; Moscow 
Times, 2002).   
By October 25, the rebels were becoming increasingly agitated at the 
authorities’ failure to remove the Russian troops from Chechnya. They allowed 
the hostages, who had to ask their female captors’ permission to leave their 
seats, to use the orchestra pit only for necessities. Though the Red Cross 
managed the release of a few more hostages, children and those in bad 
condition, the tension continued to increase. Finally, Barayev announced that, 
after midnight, he would execute ten hostages an hour if their demands were not 
met. At 8:30, Sergei Mironov, the chairman of the Federation Council, addressed 
the assailants from the Ekho Moskvy radio station. Declaring that, as the rebels 
had already achieved their objective by capturing the world’s attention through 
the international media, they should leave the theater and Russia.  
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At 11:00, General Kazantsev, the Kremlin representative for the southern 
federal district, phoned Barayev’s right-hand man, promising to negotiate with 
them at 11:00 the next day. The rebels considered this a small victory and 
rewarded the hostages by handing out cartons of juice. They would postpone the 
executions, they said. The government now had a deadline, a threat, and a 
dilemma: Make progress in the negotiations or face retribution. Kazantsev, 
however, made no preparations to fly to Moscow. It was all part of a Russian plan 
of deception. Putin had already decided that the only solution was to storm the 
theater (HBO, 2004; Dunlop, 2004).  
At midnight, a man came into the theater. He had come to fetch his son, 
he said. But when no son stepped forward, the terrorists took him outside and 
killed him. Then one of the gunmen shot at a young boy, though without harming 
him. Panicked, the boy ran toward the big bomb. Then two hostages were killed 
instantly; two others were wounded. Amid the chaos, Barayev, declaring that it 
was all an accident, called immediately for an ambulance.  
3. The Three-hour Rescue 
Behind the scenes, the Russian Special Forces had been planning to 
storm the building since the onset of the rebels’ attack on the theater. By mixing 
with the negotiators inside the theater, they were able to plant electronic and 
acoustic surveillance devices. Therefore, unbeknownst to the hostages and 
terrorists alike, their movements were being closely monitored. On October 25, 
Alpha and Vympel teams rehearsed the assault plan.21 By 1:00 p.m. October 26, 
they were ready.  
At 5:00 other teams used the air-conditioning system to pump a lethal 
anesthetic gas into the theater.22 For almost a half hour, the Alpha and Vympel 
teams waited for the gas to put the gunmen and hostages to sleep. 
Unexpectedly, one of the hostages came out of the building, showing no 
                                            
21 Both Alpha and Vympel are counterterrorist units that work under the FSB Operations 
Center. Information retrieved on 2 November 2005 from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_Group 
22 It was later revealed that the gas was an analog for fentanyl, probably remifentanil, used 
combined with other drugs or by itself as anesthesia. The article describing the gas also 
discusses whether the Russian authorities violated international law. Information retrieved on  
November 2, 2005, from: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/02110b.htm#fnB2  
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symptoms of inhaling the potent gas. Five minutes later, the teams stormed the 
building. Finding a small number of male captors still conscious, the Special 
Forces killed them all. During the rescue operation, they also shot the sleeping 
female rebels and neutralized their explosives.  
It took less than fifteen minutes for the Special Forces teams to eliminate 
all the hostage-takers. It would take more than two hours to release the hostages 
from the auditorium. With the help of medical teams, the military troops pulled or 
carried hostages outside the building, where they attempted to give them the 
prescribed antidote. But there were not enough stretchers or enough medics to 
administrate the antidote. And therefore, a hundred and seventeen hostages with 
heart or respiratory conditions died, both inside and outside the theater. Another 
forty-two were hospitalized. Later some doctors would claim that they had not 
been told about the gas and thus did not know how to treat the hostages. Others 
said that FSB officers “advised” them not to talk about the gas. The final death 
toll was a hundred and twenty-nine hostages (HBO, 2004; Dunlop, 2004). 
Altogether, the rescue operation saved more than six hundred hostages 
and killed all the Chechen captors. President Putin praised the Russian Special 
Forces, awarding six men, including the officer who pumped the gas. He also 
thanked Yavlinsky for his part in the negotiations. The Russian populace and 
governments and people around the world were horrified by the Russian 
authorities’ use of gas. The government pointed to the discovery of more than 
two hundred pounds of explosives inside the building as proof that their drastic 
measures had prevented a greater disaster (Davies, 2003, p. 223; Dunlop, 
2004).  
4. A Brief Analysis 
One might argue that the principles for the hostage rescue were well 
implemented. The intelligence provided by hostages and the surveillance devices 
planted in the theater gave the special forces the information they needed to plan 
and rehearse the hostage rescue. And General Kazantsev’s ability to convince 
the Chechens that he would come and negotiate with them gave the rescuers 
time to develop and implement the plan. This also allowed the operational 
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headquarters to choose the best time strategically for storming the building. 
Everyone, including the hostage-takers, knew that the Russians would eventually 
storm the theater, but only the planners knew exactly when it would happen 
(Dunlop, 2004).  More important, only a few knew that they would use gas to put 
both the hostages and the rebels to sleep, thereby allowing the assault teams to 
take them completely by surprise.  
Compared to the other crisis cases discussed here, this incident case has 
some unique characteristics. The extremely large number of hostages resulted in 
some spontaneous and dangerous reactions by both the hostages and the 
hostage-takers. The rebels were also well aware of the Russian authorities’ 
tendency to use military force in times of crisis.  
5. Crisis Management Procedures 
a. Security and Medical Measures 
Although the police and military troops took immediate control of 
the theater perimeter, they were not able to maintain it. Two people were able to 
enter the theater undetected, one on the first night of the siege, the second on 
the final night. Those events clearly showed the incompetence of the security 
cordon.  The intruders’ sudden and unexpected appearance created renewed 
panic among the crowd of hostages and rebels, which resulted in both their 
deaths and, in one instance, hostage deaths as well. The security forces’ inability 
to prevent these episodes was a serious and embarrassing failure. 
It was the lack of medical teams at the scene, however, that made 
this one of the most dramatic hostage crises ever. Barry Davies (2003), a former 
SAS officer, argues that, in cases like this one, using gas is a feasible method to 
pacify hostage-takers, but, he emphasizes, it requires immediate medical support 
on a large scale (p. 224). In this case, the operatives did not plan sufficiently for 
medical support; thus the medical teams called to treat the hostages were 
hopelessly disorganized, which, indisputably, contributed greatly to the large 
death toll. The medics somewhat absolved themselves when they revealed that 
they were not aware of what was in the gas. In the final analysis, the Russian 
authorities were blamed: if they had informed the physicians about the gas, they 
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could have prevented much of the tragic outcome. Led Fedorov, head of the 
Russian Union for Chemical Safety, made a scandalous observation: “What was 
in the gas? We are never going to know exactly what chemical it was because in 
this country the state is more important than the people” (Dunlop, 2004).   
b. Negotiations. Stalling for Time 
The negotiators seemed to make a sincere effort to persuade the 
hostage- takers to release hostages. In the end, the number of negotiators, 
whether too many or too few, was not an issue. No one told them about the 
planned assault, and though they had only suspicions, they were able to act 
natural in front of the hostage takers. Surprisingly, General Kazantsev, who 
made only one phone call, played an important role in the rescue plan. Because 
of his past outspokenness about the plight of the Chechens, the terrorists 
believed Kazantsev and ignored the deadline for the hostage executions. 
Kazantsev convinced to postpone the deadline for twelve hours, just enough to 
give the assault teams time for to prepare the raid. We will never know what 
would have happened if, instead, the terrorists began executing hostages and 
the teams were ordered to storm the theater. Quite probably, given the 
circumstances, a rushed and disorderly rescue would have had catastrophic 
consequences. 
c. Handling the Media 
In this hostage crisis, the Russian authorities were unable to control 
the media. There was fierce competition between the media groups, and they 
became very aggressive in their attempts to get information. In light of their past 
experiences, the media knew that the authorities would probably lie about current 
events, so they tried to obtain interviews with the hostages and hostage-takers 
during the crisis. And whatever information they managed to get, they broadcast. 
This meant that it was the media, not the government that controlled the flow of 
information into and out of the theater. Politkovskaya’s involvement in 
negotiations as well as in a much-publicized interview with Francheitti was also 
effective: it enabled the hostage-takers to maintain a hard stance during 
negotiations. Had the hostage-takers dealt only with the government, they may 
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have made difficult and crucial concessions, but worldwide attention reinforced 
their ability to blackmail the government and hold tight to their demands. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, as soon as the standoff ended, the 
Russian authorities implemented various measures against the media for their 
release of information during the crisis. First, the Russian Media Ministry shut 
down the Moskoviya television station for broadcasting a hostage interview 
calling for an end to the war in Chechnya and showing footage of the special 
operation troops surrounding the theater. Second, authorities closed down the 
Ekho Moskvy radio-station website until the station agreed to remove a video of a 
half-hour interview with the rebels. Third, the Russian Press Ministry issued a list 
of sixteen recommendations to the major media representatives, warning 
journalists that coverage of sensitive security information could endanger 
people’s lives.  Moreover, they added, interviews with the hostage-takers would 
create panic and negatively affect the negotiations process. Rustam Arifdzhanov, 
the editor of Versiya, a Russian newspaper, had the same opinion in regard to 
coverage of tactical details of the military’s counterterrorism plans, but he 
disagreed with the ministry's recommendation that the press not analyze such 
operations afterwards. “Special forces exist not for the sake of special forces, but 
for the sake of society,” Arifdzhanov said, “and it is [the media's] duty to discuss 
their performance” (PBS, 2002).  
But in mid-November 2002, the disputed recommendations came to 
fruition in a number of anti-terror measures that were approved by both the upper 
and lower house of the Russian Duma. The secretary of the Russian Union of 
Journalists, Mikhail Fedotov, agreed emphatically with the measures. "Lives are 
more important than the right to information,” he said. “If you understand that 
your words could worsen the hostages’ situation, then you should shut up” (PBS, 
2002). Although President Putin vetoed the amendments, he condemned the 
media coverage of the Moscow hostage crisis: “The main weapon of terrorists is 
not grenades and submachine guns and bullets, but blackmail, and the best 
means of such blackmail is to turn a terrorist act into a public show” (PBS, 2002).  
53 
In what might be considered a final word on the matter, as the 
general secretary of the International Federation of Journalists, Aidan White, 
pointed out: “Media and journalists are only too well aware of the horrifying 
consequences of terrorism and they don't need lectures from politicians about 
how to tailor their coverage to suit the public interest” (PBS, 2002).  
 
B.  CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES OF THE ALPHA AND VYMPEL 
IN THE BESLAN SCHOOL CRISIS: BESLAN, RUSSIA, 2004 
1. Background 
Historians note several incidents prior to the Beslan hostage crisis that 
would later prove significant. On May 9, 2004, a bomb attack at a stadium in 
Chechnya killed the pro-Moscow Chechen president, Akhmad Kadyrov, and 
thirteen others. It was allegedly reported that the bomb was set up during the 
stadium’s reconstruction. On August 24, two Chechen females killed over ninety 
people in separate suicide bombings on two airplanes. A week later, another 
suicide bomber killed ten people near a Moscow metro station after security 
forces deterred his entrance. All of these terrorist attacks were forgotten in the 
subsequent horror of the Beslan hostage crisis. 
2. The Case 
On September 1, 2004, thirty-two Chechen radicals, in a Gaz 66 truck and 
a UAZ Russian jeep loaded with weapons and equipment — rocket propelled 
grenade launchers (RPGs), submachine guns, sniper rifles, gas masks, and even 
remote-control surveillance cameras — seized School No. 1 in Beslan, N. Osetia. 
They killed twenty-one people outright before taking numerous hostages, most of 
them children, pushing them into the school gymnasium, where they set up 
improvised explosive charges surrounding them. 
In the confusion just before and during the takeover, some of the hostages 
got away. One of them, a police officer, who escaped while the gunmen were 
moving their weapons and equipment, quickly informed the local authorities 
about what was happening. Twenty-seven children also escaped. It soon 
became obvious that the gunmen planned to do more than simply hold people 
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hostage. Their ultimate purpose was terror. When the terrified children could not 
be quieted, the hostage- takers shot dead a man male in front of them as an 
example. Their leader, Ruslan Tagirovich Khuchbarov, nicknamed “the Colonel,” 
then killed one of his subordinates who protested the capture of the children. 
Later, in the courtyard, he would blow up the only two female terrorists for the 
same reason (Plater-Zyberk, 2004, p. 2).  
The Chechens first demanded that the local authorities bring four people 
to the school: the president of North Osetia, Aleksandr Dzasokhov; the president 
of Ingushetia, Murat Zyazikov; Putin’s advisor, Alkhanov; and a pediatric doctor, 
Leonid Roshal, who had been one of the negotiators in the Moscow theater 
crisis. The Moscow authorities, however, feared that the terrorists intended to 
execute the four, and, from the start, President Putin sent mixed messages.  
On September 1, Putin announced that Russia intended to “counter 
terrorism consistently and severely, as much as necessary.” Yet, on the second 
day, he stated that “the main thing in the Beslan siege is to save people’s lives.” 
That same day, Andreyev said simply that there was “no alternative to dialogue” 
in the case of hostage-takers (Plater-Zyberk, 2004, 4), which seriously confused 
the issue. The question in everyone’s mind was: Would the government seek to 
resolve the situation militarily, or would it pursue a negotiated approach. 
There was also confusion about the number of hostages. According to the 
local officials, there were “only three hundred and fifty-four hostages” in the 
school, a number repeated over and over on Russian TV. This made both the 
families and the hostage-takers very uneasy. The hostages’ relatives began to 
make their own list, to prove that there were many more than three hundred and 
fifty hostages. The terrorists were so angered by the news that they cut-off the 
water supply for the children and threatened to kill hostages until only three 
hundred and fifty-four remained. Only when the newspapers made a correction 
did the authorities acknowledge that there were more than nine hundred 
hostages in the school.  
55 
Initially, a cordon formed by local police and 58th Army troops surrounded 
the building. But when the actual number of hostages was publicized, local 
armed volunteers, fearing a repeat of Dubrovka and similar situations, in which 
the actions of Russian forces caused high casualties, joined the security ring. 
They were determined to prevent Alpha and Vympel Special Forces teams from 
storming the school. Andreyev, the head of FSB Patrushev and the local FSB 
claimed that, given the sensitive nature of the situation, with such a large number 
of children involved, they had no such plan. In a radio interview during the siege, 
Aleksandr Yermolin, former head of the Vympel operations department, pointed 
out that, if Special Forces teams attempted to storm the school, the armed 
volunteers would no doubt shoot them without notice. Eventually, an inner 
security cordon was formed that consisted of a mix of untrained local volunteers 
and the special teams (Plater-Zyberk, 2004, p. 4). 
On the second day, Dr. Roshal’s negotiations with the gunmen were 
unsuccessful; Khuchbarov refused to exchange children for adults and to allow 
food and water to be brought to the school. The gunmen wanted to talk only to 
Ruslan Aushev, former President of Ingushetia, who persuaded them to release 
twenty-six women and children. Through Aushev, the hostage takers sent Putin a 
note with their demands, setting a deadline “no later than September 4” for 
Putin’s response. Two of the demands were very extreme, if not outlandish:  the 
Russian troops must withdraw from Chechnya and Putin must resign. In addition, 
the hostage takers stated that the hostages would not be allowed to either eat or 
drink and would be given no medicines until their demands were fulfilled.  
Dzasokhov set up an operational headquarters in Technical School No. 8, 
not far from School No. 1, and a few hours after the siege began, Patrushev, the 
head of FSB, and Nurgalyev, the minister of internal affairs, joined him. At that 
time, the authorities, both federal and local, believed that there were only 
seventeen gunmen.  
On September 3, the rebels requested the removal of the twenty-one 
bodies in the school backyard; they agreed to admit four men to carry them out.  
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At approximately 1:00 p.m., as the officials of the Emergencies Ministry 
approached, the crowd heard two explosions in the school. Survivors said later 
that one of the improvised mines peeled off in the heat, exploding on impact. 
However, other witnesses claimed that someone had tripped a wire attached to 
explosives. In any case, one of the groups of armed volunteers either panicked 
or decided to storm the school (Plater-Zyberk, 2004, p. 5). 
3. The Eleven-hour Rescue 
Local volunteers and terrorists were soon engaged in a fierce battle, and 
within a half hour, special antiterrorist teams joined the assault. Then the hostage 
takers began to detonate the bombs and eventually the gym roof collapsed. As 
the rebels started shooting at children fleeing from the upper floors, the hostages’ 
relatives broke through the police cordon and ran towards the school. Three 
armored personnel carriers approached the school and Special Forces teams 
blew holes in the walls so the hostages could escape (BBC, 2004).  
The troops found and killed some of the captors in the school basement; 
they found one gunman outside the building hiding under a truck. Shortly after 
midnight, when all but one of the terrorists lay dead, the shootout ended. Later, 
the security forces would claim that they had gained control of the school almost 
nine hours earlier.  
In the aftermath, there were not enough civilian and military ambulances 
to transport the wounded, so local volunteers and military personnel used private 
cars to take many of the hostages to hospitals. A field hospital set up near the 
school provided the survivors with food and water.  
Three hundred and thirty-eight hostages were dead; more than half of 
them children. More than seven hundred hostages were wounded. The FSB lost 
nine officers, one NCO, and thirty were wounded. They killed thirty terrorists and 
captured one; a mob beat another to death. In the official investigation that 
followed, officers found twenty assault rifles, two antitank grenade-launchers, two 
additional grenade launchers, eight handguns, and six bombs at the scene of the 
terror.  
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4. A Brief Analysis 
In the Beslan school crisis, those at the operational headquarters dealt 
with tasks that eventually put their operatives and the hostages at great risk. 
Given the disparity between the decision makers’ statements, some argue that 
those in charge had no plan for either negotiating or rescuing the hostages. In 
addition, their poor control over the media and the crowd of family members and 
other locals at the scene forecast an appalling outcome. Consequently, the public 
believed that the police and Special Forces’ had handled the situation in the 
worst possible way, and public confidence in and support for authority declined 
accordingly (Oliker, 2005, pp. 35–36).  
The local authorities did not establish an effective security cordon and 
failed to foresee the disastrous outcome of the crisis. Once local civilians joined 
the cordon, the authorities lost control of both the crowd and access to the 
hostage takers. The media also played a significant role, vociferously criticizing 
both the government and those at operation headquarters. When the special 
forces proved unable to take the appropriate measures to deal with the hostage 
takers’ violent reactions, that inability eliminated any hope for a mature response 
to the crisis. As a result, the local authorities waited for orders from the Kremlin, 
which never came, on how to cope with the unfolding events.  
The tragic ending of Beslan hostage taking had an enormous impact 
throughout Russian and, indeed, the world. Some military analysts compare it to 
9/11 in terms of the horrendous shock to the nation. The federal and local 
authorities, confronted with their failure, began to consider more effective ways to 
deal with terrorist situations. In light of the tragedy of Beslan, governments must 
develop policies regarding hostage takings that are based, first and foremost, on 
protecting and saving lives (Plater-Zyberk, 2004, pp. 9-11). 
5. Crisis Management Procedures 
a. Security and Medical Measures 
In Beslan, the lack of coordination among the forces that 
participated in the security cordon was a critical factor in the violent outcome. 
The 58th Army and OMON troops (a special purpose militia detachment) 
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established a security ring before the special operations troops and local 
volunteers arrived at the school. But they were unable to prevent the extra forces 
from joining the security cordon. As a result, no one person or group was in 
command and control of the crowd, many of whom did not trust typical military 
methods. This meant that the operation headquarters had a very difficult task. 
Even if the special teams had developed a rescue plan, they would probably not 
have been unable to carry it out (Plater-Zyberk, 2004, p. 5). 
The security forces positioned themselves just three hundred feet 
from the school, and, therefore, they found it very difficult to keep people out of 
the area. Both President Dzasokhov and the local leaders would later 
acknowledge how difficult it was to control the local armed men and the 
hostages’ families. Moreover, the military commanders and the locals disagreed 
both among themselves and with Dzasokhov about how to maintain the 
perimeter. It they had established the security perimeter two blocks farther away, 
they would not have had to deal with the desperate people who tried to break 
through the cordon at the least sign of violence from the school. With the crowds 
farther away, the authorities could have kept secret the developments on the 
school grounds. 
Most of the locals had relatives in the school, and everyone knew 
that it was common practice for the military to use force in this type of situation. 
Thus, the locals, terrified that the federal and local officials would choose to 
attempt a rescue mission rather than negotiate with the hostage takers, swarmed 
to the site, greatly complicating an already tense situation. 
Another factor that shows the pitiful gaps in the security measures 
is that the security teams made no attempt to evacuate the residents of the 
surrounding buildings. Some, therefore, witnessed the shoot-out and were 
shocked to see terrorists on the school roof shooting at hostages, including large 
numbers of children.  
As for the medical measures, the local authorities were not 
prepared because they did not expect such an outcome. After the gym’s roof 
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collapsed, most of the hostages tried to flee the school. Those who were not 
seriously hurt were treated at a nearby field hospital. More than seven hundred 
people were injured, and the medical teams were quickly overwhelmed and could 
not respond efficiently. Soldiers seized military and civilian ambulances and cars 
to take the injured to the various hospitals. This reduced the risk that the 
hostages in critical condition would die from a lack of medical attention. If the 
Beslan authorities had had a plan in place for a worst-case scenario, a terrorist 
incident with many injuries and casualties, they would have had many 
ambulances and medical personnel in position from the beginning.  
b. Negotiations: Stalling for Time 
Because the hostage takers’ demanded specific negotiators, the 
local authorities found themselves in a critical position when those appointed 
could not reach a solution. The assailants’ hard stance against Dr. Roshal should 
have prompted the local and federal authorities to choose other negotiators. 
Obviously, the media reports about the hostage numbers also made the gunmen 
act impulsively, and they refused to make even small concessions. The local 
authorities looked to the Kremlin for assistance because they were completely 
unprepared for such an extreme incident.  
c.  Handling the Media 
The authorities did not understand their own reactions and how 
those reactions would affect their decisions. They must have realized that the 
hostage crisis could end with a lot of casualties, but by holding to the official 
figure of only three hundred and fifty-four hostages for two days, they angered 
both the hostage takers and the public. Once the families announced their own 
projections about the number of hostages, the government quickly lost control 
over the media, which publicized the actual figures. When the siege ended, the 
people attacked many of the TV crews, saying they had “lied” about the numbers. 
As an OSCE report put it: “a triple credibility gap arose, between the government 
and the media, between the media and the citizens, and between the 
government and people” (Haraszti, 2004, p. 2).   
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C.  CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter discussed two cases in which poor management of a crisis 
determined appalling outcomes. Though the two hostage crises occurred only 
two years apart, the assailants in the second case were the only ones prepared 
for a hostage scenario. In the first case, the government had a well-prepared 
rescue plan for saving the hostages. In the second case, there was no plan and 
deficient command and control. More important, in the first case, the response 
was not one that was likely to deter future hostage takings.  
The security measures in the cases had a great impact on the hostages’ 
lives. In the first case, at least four hostages died because the security forces at 
the perimeter were inadequately deployed. In the second crisis, the operational 
headquarters lost control of the crowd and the security perimeter. That failure led 
to the disastrous outcome. In all likelihood, the combination of Special Forces 
teams and armed volunteers was a major factor in the resulting hundreds of 
casualties. 
As for the medical procedures, both cases illustrate that the local 
authorities were largely unprepared. In the first crisis, the lack of medics and 
information about the hostages’ condition contributed to its tragic ending. At 
Beslan, the local medical resources were not used efficiently, mostly because 
there were no contingency plans. 
In contrast to other cases, the Russians had no negotiators who could 
gain the assailants’ confidence.  In Moscow, General Kazantsev’s intervention 
had a crucial impact on the hostage takers’ course of action. In the second case, 
the negotiated interventions never occurred or were planned to come too late.  
In both incidents, the Russian media was a main contributor to both the 
negotiation processes and the final outcomes. In the Moscow hostage crisis, for 
instance, the involvement of a reporter and a radio broadcast in the negotiation 




local authorities used the media to misinform the public, which led to a mass 
revolt when the information was challenged and the true extent of the crisis was 
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V. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR ROMANIAN 
AUTHORITIES AND MILITARY 
A. THE ROMANIAN GENERAL-BASED MODEL: LESSONS LEARNED 
The purpose of this project was to analyze various hostage rescue 
operations, to assess their procedures, and to isolate the crucial elements of 
hostage rescue practices. Ultimately, the goal was to provide preliminary 
guidance to the Romanian Special Forces as they develop a doctrine and 
operational strategy for hostage rescue operations. This section draws on the 
case studies presented in the previous two chapters and attempts to describe an 
ideal process for dealing with a hostage crisis.  
1. Security Measures 
A democratic government’s fundamental principle in dealing with a 
hostage crisis is to show the people that it is actively involved in reinstating order 
and restoring security. In its response to the crisis, the government has an 
opportunity to show that it will do everything in its power to defend its citizens. 
This is absolutely necessary if the regime is to maintain the public’s positive 
opinion about the government (Aston, 1982, p. 164).   
The case studies demonstrated that officials’ first task in effectively 
responding to a crisis is to establish a distant and effective perimeter. In the 
successful cases, the local/national police employed physical security measures 
that illustrate this dynamic. In contrast, in both the Russian cases, the authorities’ 
lack of coordination and effective maintenance of the security perimeter led, in 
the Moscow case, directly and, in the Beslan case, indirectly to the killing of 
hostages.   
The cases also showed the importance of information gathering. The 
police or military operatives can use information gathered at the scene to plan an 
appropriate approach to the situation. In this regard, the crisis cell must know 
how to choose effective negotiators and how to give the public accurate 
information without revealing aspects that could jeopardize a rescue operation. If 
possible, and with police assistance, these forces should plan and prepare the 
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mission in an area away from media representatives. When that is not possible, 
their maintenance of an effective security cordon can be critical for the delicate 
task of information management. Information leaks were a key issue in several 
cases: they compromised the rescue operations. Finally, in the successful rescue 
operations, the police/military personnel created an effective security cordon that 
enabled them to control activities within the target area. In the Russian case, 
however, the officials’ failure to maintain the security cordon and a sufficient 
perimeter resulted in an intrusion of “volunteers” into the operation.  
2. Medical Effectiveness 
As was clear in all the cases, in the post-incident phase, sufficient medical 
personnel and ambulances must be in position ready to attend to the injured or 
sick hostages or rescue teams and to deliver them to nearby hospitals if 
necessary. This rule applies to all rescue operations, because it is impossible to 
know in advance whether there will be minimal or major casualties, or no 
casualties at all. In the German case, there were thirty medics to treat the injured 
hostages, while in the Moscow case, there were not enough medics, a 
circumstance that resulted in unnecessary deaths. Both cases demonstrate the 
importance of a well-planned and implemented strategy for the post-rescue 
phase. In the Beslan case, planning for and implementing medical care at the 
scene proved especially critical because the field hospital was overwhelmed by 
the number of injured hostages. The authorities were simply not prepared with 
contingencies for such outcomes. They failed to anticipate circumstances, such 
as an explosion, that would create a mass medical emergency among newly-
freed hostages. The consequences were dramatic not only because of the 
number of dead hostages, but also because the previous case two years earlier 
demonstrated similar circumstances and similar results. 
3. Handling the Media 
Antokol and Nudell (1990) point out that terrorist acts such as taking 
hostages are newsworthy and, regardless of how reports are prepared, they will 
spread information about tactics and procedures, and offer encouragement to 
others to think of terrorist activity as a way to publicize their cause (p. 77).  The 
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authors also state that “the decision-makers must be responsive to the needs of 
media, and reporters have to understand the sensitivities of the situation” (p. 83). 
The importance of cooperating with media representatives is crucial in hostage 
taking situations. As the above cases with major fatalities show, a lack of 
communication and coordination between the government and the media can 
lead to disastrous outcomes. The government and the media must balance two 
important aspects of rescue operations with the imperatives of press freedom.  
First, rescue operations in the planning stage must be kept secret and, second, 
the government must control the information that flows into and out of the 
hostage area. This means that the government cannot simply bar the media from 
covering the event as it unfolds. It also means that government and media must 
develop and maintain a cooperative relationship.  
All the above cases, except the British case, included problems pertaining 
to the media coverage and the ways authorities dealt with it. First, the electronic 
media, especially, should be careful about what it reports concerning ongoing 
counterterrorism measures, such as: the gathering of tactical intelligence on 
terrorists, the decision to attempt an assault, and the strategic positioning of 
Special Forces personnel (Antokol, Nudell, 1990, p. 78). The German case 
provides a good example of too much publicity: the terrorists killed the pilot, 
Shumann, because a radio report revealed he had leaked information about the 
hostages’ situation. In another instance, from the Peruvian case, the Japanese 
report of an interview froze the negotiation process.  
The cases with major fatalities show that careless media coverage is often 
a main factor in disastrous outcomes. Journalists’ involvement in negotiations 
puts pressure on both the hostage takers and the local/national authorities. In the 
Moscow case, the journalist’s involvement reminded the hostage takers of one of 
their goals—publicity for their cause—and they then became uncooperative. On 
the other hand, in Beslan, the Russian authorities used the media as a tool to 
misinform the public, also with disastrous results. When they reported a much 
smaller number of hostages than there actually were, the hostage takers 
responded by stating that they would kill off hostages until the number of those 
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living matched the one reported. This use of the media, therefore, not only 
created panic among the hostages and their families, but also had a negative 
impact on the terrorists, who had no compunction against killing hostages. In the 
end, the whole incident caused an erosion of public confidence in both the 
authorities and the media. The decline in confidence, in turn, undermined the 
legitimacy of the government and the media. The local citizenry reacted by 
forming a corps of volunteers and joining the security professionals. Ultimately, 
they were responsible for the storming of the school before a coherent rescue 
operation could be planned.   
The general-based model presents a guideline for a crisis management 
process that minimizes the risk of hostage deaths. To date, there have been no 
Romanian cases in which hostage rescue procedures could be implemented. 
The next section will focus on the freedom of the media in Romania and its 
influence. As the model shows, the relation between the media and the local 
government can contribute in a major way to the occurrence of fatalities in a 
hostage crisis. 
 
B. ROMANIA’S MEDIA FREEDOM AND ITS INFLUENCE 
Since the fall of communism, the birth or survival of national media outlets 
has depended primarily on a state’s political and economic circles. In Romania, 
the government has had substantial control over the press, though recently, there 
have been indications that this control may be decreasing.  But government 
control over the media is a double-edged sword: while it could prevent such 
problems as those that occurred in the Russian hostage crises, it also poses a 
major problem for democratic consolidation.  
Many local and international organizations in Romania strongly criticize 
the ruling party’s use of the media to influence public opinion. For example, the 
Social Democrat Party (SDP), the ruling party from 1990 to 1996 and 2000 to 
2004, has been warned several times that freedom of the press has declined 
under its rule. In its 2004 report, the Media Monitoring Agency (MMA) shows that 
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pressure was put on the electronic media to present government policies in a 
positive light and to promote government actions.23 For instance, at election time, 
the press published transcripts of the SDP’s permanent delegation meeting, 
which was considered a scandalous subject, but one with major public appeal. It 
received barely any coverage in the electronic media, however, which created 
considerable resentment among the populace.24 Furthermore, the lack of 
investigative journalism in Romania’s TV news and the press led the international 
community to believe that there had been no substantial progress in assuring the 
freedom of the media.  
The Romanian media, therefore, is considered highly politicized. A good 
example of this is the TV channel Antena 1, rated the number two channel in 
privatized TV. Antena 1 periodically changes its issue prioritization according to 
the agenda of its primary patron at the time. Dan Voiculescu, the president of the 
Conservator Part (the former Humanist Party) owns Antena 1. Reports claim that, 
in just one year, 2004, the channel changed its agenda-setting three times. Yet 
before the Humanist Party signed an alliance with the SDP, Antena 1 had been 
relatively critical toward the government. It was only after the two joined forces 
that the station suddenly began to cover only the opposition’s actions. After the 
general election, the Humanist Party broke the alliance, and Antena 1 resumed 
its critical approach toward the SDP.  
The Freedom House 2004 rankings rated the Romanian press “partially 
free,” placing it at 104 out of the 194 countries that were surveyed. Compared to 
other countries analyzed, the press in Romania would place between the 
Peruvian media, “partially free,” and the Russian media, “not free”.25 This ranking 
raises the question whether Romanian authorities would be able to control the 
                                            
23 The report analyzed the positive, neutral, and negative effects of electronic media on 
different politicians from both the government and the opposition. Retrieved on 22 November 
2005 from: http://www.mma.ro/BAZA%20DE%20DATE/Politic/freeex2004/freeex2004.doc 
24 For more about the SDP transcripts and a full report on the Romanian media, see: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2005/romania2005.pdf  
25 Peru is placed at 90, with 40 negative points, and Russia at 151, with 68 negative points. 
Romania has 47 negative points. See: Freedom of Press 2005. Retrieved on 24 November 2005 
from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey/fop05.pdf  
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media coverage during a hostage crisis without jeopardizing freedom of speech. 
The press’s lack of freedom is due partly to the politicized nature of the news 
coverage and partly to the lack of transparency in media ownership. Although 
since April 2003, the law prohibits public servants from running businesses, there 
is still no transparency of media-outlet ownership. 
In any case, the following incident seems to indicate that the Romanian 
media may not be prepared to handle greater autonomy, even it if were granted. 
1. The Case 
On March 29, 2005, three Romanian journalists and their official guide, 
Muhammad Munaf, a citizen of the United States, Romania, and Iraq, were 
kidnapped in front of their hotel in Baghdad. Two of the journalists sent cell 
phone messages to their colleagues at Prima TV in Romania. One of the 
journalists, Marie Jeanne Ion, is the daughter of a Romanian senator, Vasile Ion. 
That evening, the kidnapers supposedly called a Syrian businessman, Omar 
Hayssan, in Romania, asking him for $4 million in ransom for the Romanian 
prisoners. Hayssan and Munaf have had a business relationship for more than 
twenty-five years. Munaf said that he had paid the journalists to do a report about 
the Sunni minority in Iraq.  
The next day, President Traian Basescu organized a crisis cell within the 
Supreme Council of National Defense (SCND),26 and the Romanian Secret 
Service facilitated negotiations between the Romanian authorities and the 
kidnappers. After three days, the kidnappers issued a video tape in which they 
demanded that the Romanian government withdraw its troops from Iraq. 
President Basescu stated that he would head a crisis headquarters that would  
 
 
                                            
26 The SCND is the deciding body concerning the following matters: the strategic concept of 
national defense, the national defense system, declaration of war, and cessation of war. It also 
coordinates responses during crises. The following officials are statutory members of the SCND: 
the president, the prime-minister, the minister of economy, the minister of national defense, the 
interior minister, the minister of foreign affairs the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service 
(SRI), and the director of the External Intelligence Service (SIE) (The Romanian Parliament, 
1990, p. 1). 
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coordinate negotiations to free the hostages. He then asked the Romanian media 
to reserve their opinions regarding the evolution and possible outcome of the 
crisis.  
Over the next three weeks, the crisis cell appealed to various international 
organizations for support, including those in Iraq. The Romanian authorities kept 
the press informed about the journalists’ condition but did not release details 
about the progress of the negotiations. Also, they reported that, at one point, the 
kidnappers had transferred the prisoners to another, purportedly more radical 
group. The negotiations continued with the new group of kidnappers. On April 22, 
another video, this time on Al-Jazeera, showed the prisoners repeating the 
terrorists’ demand that the Romania withdraw its troops from Iraq. At this point, 
they set a deadline: April 26 at 6:00 p.m. During this time, meetings and 
demonstrations supporting the kidnapped journalists and protesting their 
kidnapping took place throughout Romania. A snap poll taken that week found 
that 70 percent of Romanians surveyed, up from 50 percent before the crisis, 
were in favor of withdrawing the troops from Iraq.27 Some opposition party 
representatives in parliament proposed to withdraw the troops in a sequential 
order as part of a crisis solution. After negotiations took place between the 
Romanian officials and the kidnappers, they changed the deadline to the next 
day. Under pressure by parliament, President Basescu convened an emergency 
session of the Security Council. Just before the deadline, the Romanian 
government used the press to ask the captors to delay the deadline. The state 
authorities also asked the kidnappers to use the mass media for further 
negotiations. Between the deadline and May 14, when the negotiation process 
resumed, several official and unofficial leaders in Iraq and from the Romanian 
Arab community requested that the prisoners be released. Finally, on May 22, 
they were released in Baghdad.  
The three Romanian journalists were escorted to Romania; Munaf was 
held by the U.S. military. A police investigation proved that Hayssan and Munaf 
                                            
27 Information retrieved on 28 November 2005 from: http://www.curs.ro/ 
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had planned the journalists’ kidnapping. Since 2003, Hayssan had been under an 
interdiction to leave Romania due to his dubious business affairs. In kidnapping 
the Romanian journalists, he hoped to leave the country for “negotiating” their 
release. On May 27, 2005, both Hayssan and Munaf were charged with 
terrorism.  
The fact that the kidnapped Romanians were journalists had a 
tremendous effect on the press: it failed to present information on the crisis in a 
balanced, impartial, and responsible manner. Newspapers and magazines 
rushed to produce stories and provide continual updates. They took a partisan 
stance, urging the government emphatically to meet the hijackers’ demands. The 
press demonstrated that, in this case, it was not an impartial recorder of events, 
according to the strict standards of media outlets worldwide.  
In addition, because of the competition to be the first to break the news of 
ongoing developments, and because of journalists’ professional and emotional 
connection to the hostages, the press failed to check the facts and to verify the 
stories they broadcast. As one Romanian media analyst noted:  
Romanian media outlets entered a competition of scenarios and 
single-sourced stories about the kidnapping. The same star 
journalists who opine publicly on anything from tennis to politics to 
business have instantly turned into kidnapping experts and have 
enlightened the public with their thoughts and theories regarding 
the events. The kidnapping was labeled as “atypical”, “strange”, 
and even as a “prank”. Maybe this is what it was, but until 
journalists lay their hands on real information, any speculation is 
not only farfetched but deceitful to the public as well (Ulmanu, May 
2005). 
In situations like this, the Romanian media may be in danger of 
discrediting itself as a reliable source of news, a dynamic similar to that 
uncovered in Beslan. Also, their frenzy over being the first to break a story could 
lead to dynamics similar to those that repeatedly delayed and jeopardized the 
German efforts to rescue the Lufthansa hostages. In sum, the Romanian media 
is immature, influenced by its owners, and irresponsible. 
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C.  ROMANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
According to the new Romanian Constitution, approved through a national 
referendum in October 2003, article 20 reflects the Romanian state’s 
commitment to international human rights treaties: 
(1) Constitutional provisions concerning the citizens' rights and 
liberties shall be interpreted and enforced in conformity with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the covenants and 
other treaties Romania is a party to. 
(2) Where any inconsistencies exist between the covenants and 
treaties on fundamental human rights Romania is a party to, and 
internal laws, the international regulations shall take precedence.28 
 
Among the international organizations to which Romania has obligations 
regarding human rights, the two most important are the United Nations (UN) and 
the Council of Europe. So far, the Romanian state has signed and/or ratified 
most of the international conventions and protocols related to human rights. 
According to the Council of Europe list of conventions and treaties, however, 
Romania still has to sign ninety-six separate treaties on various matters.29 
Romanian human rights legislation is current based on several documents: the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a regional human rights treaty, the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and 
the Romanian Constitution.30  
In ratifying the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, Romania 
permitted Council of Europe judicial and control bodies to intervene in the 
Romanian legislation process. Since 1998, the Council using its two main 
instruments — the European Court for Human Rights and the Committee of 
                                            
28 Romanian Constitution, Article 20. International human rights treaties. Information 
retrieved on 2 December 2005, from: http://www.romania.org/romania/constitution2.html 
29 Information retrieved on 2 December 2005, from: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeStats.asp?PO=ROM&MA=999&CM=17&CL=ENG 
30 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. It 
was ratified by Romania in 1955. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950; it was ratified by 
Romania in 1994. Information retrieved on 2 December 2005 from: http://legislatie.resurse-
pentru-democratie.org/legi_drepturi.php#01  
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Ministers — to guarantee protection of human rights among its fifty-five European 
members.31 The EU can use these two instruments also to influence Romanian 
legislation, either while it is under debate in the legislature or after it has been 
ratified.    
However, the Romanian Constitution contains clauses related to freedom 
of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion that may violate 
accepted human rights standards. Thus, there is some potential that the 
supranational institutions could exercise their powers against Romania. 
According to a 2004 U.S. Department of State country report, for example, 
Romania’s legal prohibitions against “defamation of the country” and “offense to 
authority” limit the freedom of the press. In that same year, the penal code was 
amended to delete the crime of “insult,” thereby removing the possibility of a 
prison sentence for defamation. Even so, journalists and media representatives 
are still harassed and dragged to court or pay huge amounts for “moral damage,” 
insult or defamation. Through those practices, Romanian law inhibits press 
freedom not only in theory, but also in practice. As for freedom of religion, under 
the law, there is no clear procedure for registering religious groups. Only 
seventeen religious groups are officially recognized by the law and are provided 
with state financial support. Some religious minorities have allegedly reported 
cases of harassment by the orthodox clergy.32   
Furthermore, a number of international and domestic nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) have reported concern about other fundamental human 
rights. The reports identify continuing problems stemming from discrimination 
against the Roma (Gypsies) and trafficking in women.33 To demonstrate that the 
Romanian state is prepared to join the European Union in 2007, it must first meet 
international human rights standards. 
                                            
31 For more about the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, and the 
Committee of Ministers, go to: <www.coe.int> Last accessed 4 December 2005. 
32 Information retrieved on 6 December 2005 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41703.htm  
33 Information retrieved on 6 December 2005 from  
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/romania/document.do?id=ar&yr=2005 
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The gap between reality and the Romanian legislature must be closed. To 
that end, Romania accepted various co-operative programs designed to establish 
an institutional and legal framework consistent with European standards. The 
Council of Europe expanded its assistance programs to help Romania develop 
the legal and policy tools necessary for combating racism, discrimination, and 
intolerance. The programs are also intended to enhance Romanian legislation 
regarding the protection of freedom of expression by providing legal expertise to 
amend existing national legislation.    
 
D.  IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ROMANIAN 
SPECIAL FORCES 
To complete this study, this section will present two sets of 
recommendations that could improve the Romanian Special Forces’ performance 
during hostage crises: do detailed planning and develop efficient interoperability 
of all the force components. 
General Shlomo Gazit (Ret.) (1981), a military analyst who contributed to 
the development of hostage-taking studies, provides a set of four principles to 
ensure smooth planning of rescue operations: 
• Search for bright, original, and even crazy ideas. One must 
look for ideas that will promote surprise in all three phases of 
operation, thus increasing the success with minimal 
casualties. Surprise is an element in any military operation. 
Whereas the key to a normal military plan is the correct 
employment of military force, the key to a successful rescue 
operation is the maximal employment of imaginative 
concepts. 
• Save time in planning and preparations. The military 
command should not wait for the political directive to draw 
up contingency plans, but should initiate such preparations 
so as to be ready when the decision is taken to proceed. 
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• Involve political decision-makers early and often so that they 
will be able to evaluate the planning ideas as they arise. A 
constant dialog is vital for two reasons: it will “kill” any ideas 
that are unacceptable because of certain political 
considerations, thus saving time and energy on their detailed 
planning; and it will avoid a situation where the military 
presents the political leadership with a single plan, leaving 
only the options of taking or leaving it. Establishing a system 
of positive feedback between the head of state and the 
planner is so important that this interchange should be 
carried out through direct meetings. Only then will each 
understand the constraints on each other. 
• Include the rescue force commanders in the planning 
process from the earliest possible moment. In addition to 
benefiting from their ideas, the military command will be able 
to avoid plans that the force commanders themselves 
believe infeasible (pp. 120-121).  
As far as the interoperability of Romanian Special Forces components is 
concerned, Major Dobocan (2004) has approached this matter with vital 
implications for Romanian Special Forces structure: 
• The complete and direct subordination of all special 
operations units to a Special Operations Directorate 
established at the general staff level. 
• The establishment of permanent liaison teams to coordinate 
intelligence flows between the Special Operations 
Directorate and the intelligence community. 
• The development of joint regulations, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures for all special operations forces. 
• The creation of specialized education and training programs 
addressed to the members of the SOF community primarily, 
but not exclusively. 
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• The development of combined/joint training exercises 
involving all services, agencies with responsibility in the 
national defense arena, and foreign partners (p. 137). 
The last recommendation above could be the starting point for the creation 
of counterterrorism teams within the Romanian Special Forces that would be 
prepared for a hostage crisis situation. However, the circumstance that is most 
important for the Romanian Special Forces community is to maintain the 
interdependence of all hostage crisis procedures. If not handled efficiently, they 
could lead to unnecessary hostage deaths before, during, or after the actual 
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